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Abstract
This thesis sketches an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus centering on his treatment
of necessity and normativity. The purpose is to unite Wittgenstein’s account of logic and
language with his brief remarks on ethics by stressing the transcendental nature of each.
Wittgenstein believes that both logic and ethics give necessary preconditions for the
existence of language and the world, and because these conditions are necessary, neither logic
nor ethics can be normative. I conclude by erasing the standard line drawn between his
philosophy and his ethics, and redrawing it between the philosophical and artistic
presentations of his thought, the latter being what remains after the nonsensical status of the
work is recognized.

Meine Methode ist es nicht, das Harte vom Weichen zu scheiden, sondern die Härte
des Weichen zu sehen.
My method is not to sunder the hard from the soft, but to see the hardness of the
soft.
-Wittgenstein, January 1915
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One Tractatus

The facts all contribute only to the setting of the problem, not to its
solution. (6.4321)

If one were to read only the secondary literature on the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, it
would almost be reasonable to conclude that there were two Wittgenstein’s, each of whom
published a separate treatise of the same name. One finds a treatise on logic, language and
their limits, which has a central location in the development of analytical philosophy, and
one also finds a set of mysterious and mystical musings, which, while having little influence
on the philosophical canon, have nonetheless been important culturally.

These “two”

treatises can be thought of as two poles on a scale of interpretation.

While most

commentary lies somewhere in between these two extremes, the vast majority of it is much
closer to the logical pole, the most extreme example of which is perhaps Carnap’s reading.
He says of his logical empiricist view as outlined in The Logical Syntax of Language that it “is in
general agreement with [Wittgenstein’s], but goes beyond it in certain important respects.”
(Carnap 1936, 282) On this view Wittgenstein puts forward a positivist philosophy in the
Tractatus, and in conclusion rejects ethics and metaphysics as nonsensical.
Reacting to precisely this, surely unsatisfactory, interpretation, Allan Janik and
Stephen Toulmin published Wittgenstein’s Vienna in 1973. They cleave a distinction between
“ethical” and “logical” interpretations of the book, and criticize the attempt – in both the
positivists and later commentators 1 – to treat the ethical conclusion of the book as a mere
1

Specifically Max Black (1964) and Elizabeth Anscombe (1971; originally 1959).
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afterthought. They argue, in response, “that, in order to understand the book in a way
which coincides with Wittgenstein’s own intentions, one must accept the primacy of the
‘ethical’ interpretation.” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 25) To justify their interpretation, they
note that Paul Engelmann, who “was in close contact with Wittgenstein during the very
period when the book was written,” had a fundamentally ethical interpretation of the book. 2
But while their rhetoric is usually of reconciling the logician with the ethicist, their actual
argument distinguishes between Wittgenstein’s logical methods, which are mere “technical
advances” of little actual importance, and his philosophical ideas, which are essentially ethical.
Wittgenstein himself gives support to both sides.

Janik’s and Toulmin’s best

evidence is a letter from Wittgenstein to Ficker, a prospective publisher:
The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence
which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here… What I
meant to write then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here
plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the
important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as
it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those
limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have
managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it…
For now, I would recommend you read the preface and the conclusion, because they
contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. (in Engelmann 1967,
143-144)
This is a direct statement about the point of the book from Wittgenstein himself, and it
cannot be ignored. But corresponding to Janik and Toulmin’s evidence in Engelmann for
the ethical interpretation, analytical commentators can look to Ramsey and his logical
interpretation. Ramsey spent weeks discussing the Tractatus with Wittgenstein in 1923 for
hours a day, and their discussions were about the logic of the book. There are also letters to
C.K. Ogden regarding the English translation, and many to Russell, all of which concern
mostly logic. And most importantly, there is the fact that every source from Wittgenstein in
2

See Engelmann’s Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir (1967), especially pp. 94-118.
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the early period contains substantial work on logic.

It would seem quite strange for

Wittgenstein to completely devote and exhaust himself for eight years on “mere techniques.”
What makes up the vast majority of the Tractatus is unquestionably the culmination of those
years of thought.
Wittgenstein’s introductory remarks to his 1929 “A Lecture on Ethics,” given in
Cambridge immediately after his return to philosophy, can help mediate the dispute. In that
lecture, Wittgenstein stresses how central ethics is for him, and says, “if I was to have the
opportunity to speak to you I should speak about something which I am keen on
communicating to you and I should not misuse this opportunity to give you a lecture about,
say, logic.” (LE 37) It is clear that ethics is of prime importance for Wittgenstein, but it is not
his only concern; he immediately continues, “I call this a misuse, for to explain a scientific
matter to you it would need a course of lectures and not an hour’s paper.” (Loc. Cit.) These
two sentences reflect the same point made in the letter to Ficker – it is not that the ethical
preface and conclusion are all that matters; it is simply that the logic is much more difficult
to understand, and the explicitly ethical remarks contain a more direct expression of the point
of the book.
The goal of this thesis is to try to unite the ethical and logical aspects of the Tractatus
into a seamless whole. Without the work in logical philosophy, there could be no ethical
conclusion to the Tractatus, and as the conclusion to the logic, the ethical points must receive
attention if the logic is to be understood. To argue for this conclusion, I track the interplay
between necessity and normativity first in logic, and then in ethics.
Let us look to the preface. Wittgenstein writes, “the whole sense of the book might
be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what
we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”

Notice the duality.

On my
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interpretation, logic and ethics stand together in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but both of them
are opposed to his mysticism. These two aspects – philosophy and mysticism – are captured
by the first and second clauses of Wittgenstein’s summary, respectively. “What can be said
at all can be said clearly” summarizes Wittgenstein’s work in logical and ethical philosophy;
“what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” marks the death of a
philosopher and the birth of a mystic.
The duality that characterizes Wittgenstein’s summary of the book pervades the
entire preface. He remarks that “the point of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or
rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts.” 3 The two sides of this limit, the
sayable and the mystical, correspond to the two part summary: on one side of the line is the
sayable, on the other is that about which we must remain silent. Again, the same duality
appears in the statement that “if this work has any value, it consists in two things.” Dealing
with the two values in turn, the first consists in that “thoughts are expressed in [the book],”
the truth of which “seem unassailable and definitive.” The first three chapters of this thesis
will argue that Wittgenstein’s work in philosophical logic culminates in his presentation of
the general form of a proposition, which is meant to explain how “everything that can be
said at all can be said clearly.” At this point, Wittgenstein is supposed to have carried the
project of philosophy to its completion, achieving “on all essential points, the final solution of
the problems.”
My argument for how Wittgenstein is able to achieve such sweeping results with a
single logical construction is to demonstrate how he attempts to collapse all of the disparate
areas of philosophy into logic. Beginning in the first chapter, I show that metaphysics and
philosophy of language are brought together, and that Wittgenstein draws the limits of sense
3

This issue receives full attention in chapter II.
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in philosophy of language. Standing precisely on the border between sense and nonsense are
tautology and contradiction, which constitute the propositions of logic. Thus, given that the
purpose of the book is to draw precisely this limit, we see that logic is central to the task.
Before addressing Wittgenstein’s logic directly, the second chapter reads the Tractatus
against the backdrop of Kant’s and Frege’s philosophy of logic. These three philosophers
stand in various relations to one another in logic; here I focus only on three connections.
The first is that, because of Frege’s influence, Kant’s critique of pure reason, becomes – in
Wittgenstein – a critique of language. Second, Wittgenstein and Kant disagree with Frege in
that they hold that logic is purely formal and empty. And most importantly, whereas Kant
and Frege both see logic as prescriptive – as giving laws in accordance with which one ought to
think, the philosophical status of Wittgenstein’s logic should be more closely identified with
Kant’s transcendental logic. Just as it would be absurd for Kant to tell us that we ought to judge
in accordance with his table of categories, because he argues we do so of absolute necessity,
it becomes absurd for Wittgenstein’s logic to tell us how we ought to speak. While Kant’s
philosophy attempts to give the necessary preconditions for empirical knowledge,
Wittgenstein’s logic attempts to give the necessary preconditions for linguistic truth. Logic
is, Wittgenstein tells us, transcendental. (6.13)
The third chapter addresses Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic, and then attempts to
show how all of the metaphysical, semantic, and logical points made thus far are captured in
the presentation of the general form of a proposition. In giving the general form of a
proposition, Wittgenstein gives “the nature of all being,” (NB 39) thus concluding his
philosophy with unparalleled elegance.
But there still remains the “second thing in which the value of the work consists:” “it
shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” To return to the letter to
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Ficker, we also need to address the “second part of the book,” that which isn’t there, or, at
least, is hinted at in closing: “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (7)
My interpretation of this side of the book, sketched in the concluding chapter, is inspired by
relatively recent scholarship labeled “the new Wittgenstein.” 4 The one point that seems to
bind all of these scholars together is their conviction that a reader must take the nonsensical
status of the Tractatus seriously. While pressing a fundamentally negative point – that we
can’t literally “understand” the philosophy of the Tractatus – these new interpreters
simultaneously open up new possibilities for studying the book as a text, instead of as a set of
philosophical assertions. We need to ask, not what philosophy we are left with, but what the
book is attempting to accomplish.
Nonetheless I break from this group. 5

One of the most influential of these

interpreters is Cora Diamond, and consideration of the opening section from her “Ethics,
Imagination and the Tractatus” crystallizes the break. She begins with a discussion of the
remark in the preface that the Tractatus is not a textbook, writing, “His intention is not that
the book should teach us things that we did not know; it does not address itself to our
ignorance.” (Diamond 1991, 149) In further developing her interpretation of this point, she
connects it with 6.54: “My propositions serve as elucidations in this way: anyone who
understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical…”

She notes the fact that

Wittgenstein writes “he who understands me” and not “my propositions.” (ibid, 150) 6 In
short, to “understand” the Tractatus is to understand Wittgenstein, and to understand
Wittgenstein is to realize that one cannot say the sort of things that he tries to say in the
Tractatus.

See especially Diamond (1991) and Crary and Read (eds) (2000).
For a critique of this new exegetical tendency, see Hacker’s article in the Crary and Read (2000).
6 Mounce (1981, 101) makes the same observation.
4
5
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Let us return to the textbook remark in the preface, but in its full context: “Perhaps
this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts
that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts. – So it is not a textbook. – Its purpose
would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it.” The
remark that forms the basis for Diamond’s reading is surrounding by sentences which
contradict her view precisely. Wittgenstein writes that the book expresses thoughts, and that
one can read and understand it. (Furthermore, immediately following the sentence quoted in
6.54 Wittgenstein returns to discussing the understanding of the book.) The point of the
textbook remark seems to be rather that Wittgenstein is not concerned with pedagogy.
We find ourselves in an awkward situation. I argued that Wittgenstein completes a
philosophical project, but that we – following Diamond and company – must recognize the
fact that its presentation is nonsensical. To resolve the difficulty, consider the following
letter written by F.P. Ramsey while he was staying with Wittgenstein in 1923: “His idea of his
book is not that anyone by reading it will understand his ideas, but that some day someone
will think them out again for himself, and will derive great pleasure from finding in this book
their exact expression.” (in LCK 78) Wittgenstein’s belief, at this later date, that nobody will
understand his ideas appears to be a mere increase in the pessimism already expressed in the
preface. (“[In the expression of my thoughts] I am conscious of having fallen a long way
short of what is possible.”) What is important about this letter is that Wittgenstein believes
that one must work through the ideas for oneself, which, again, is reinforced by the textbook
remark. Therefore, one can’t simply shrug off the logic. As Wittgenstein puts it at 6.54, the
reader must “climb out through them, on them, over them… He must transcend these
propositions.” It is only in climbing first “through them,” and then “on them,” that one can
climb “over” them and see that they are nonsensical. If we – like the new Wittgensteinians –
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denounce them as mere babble, then we lose the very grounds for declaring them to be so.
If the Tractatus really is just “austere” nonsense (as Conant calls it), 7 then so is Wittgenstein’s
distinction between sense and nonsense in the first place.
Janik and Toulmin divide the Tractatus into logic and philosophy (i.e. ethics). The
line needs, rather, to be drawn between logic (i.e. philosophy) and mysticism. And most
importantly, both sides of the line find expression in the Tractatus and they are mutually
dependent. In the first three chapters, I argue that all of the major areas of philosophy 8
collapse into logic. The opening sections of the final chapter argues the same point for
ethics. Ethics, like logic, is a necessary condition of the world, standing outside its limits. If
we return to the letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein remarks that he “limits the sphere of the
ethical from the inside.” This is exactly how he characterizes his logical work, as drawing a
distinction between sense and nonsense by working through what can be said. Ethics stands
philosophically with logic, both of which are necessary conditions of the world, and as such,
contain absolutely no normative force.
It is in seeing this – that nothing of importance is accomplished via philosophy – and,
furthermore, that philosophy is an attempt to express the ineffable, that we are able to pass
from 6.54 to 7. But only after we have worked through the philosophy of the book are we
able to abandon it; only after climbing the ladder may we throw it away. In doing so, one
ceases to be a philosopher. Thus the Tractatus, after it is understood as a treatise on logical
philosophy, ceases to be one, and becomes an expression of Wittgenstein’s unique
mysticism. The concluding section will argue that this process is contained in the text of the
Tractatus itself; the ultimate purpose of the book is to present a transition from philosophy to
mysticism.
7
8

This is the central claim in Conant (2000).
Except, of course, epistemology, which Wittgenstein shrugs aside as psychology. (4.1121, 5.541 and NL 106)
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I. Sense, Nonsense, and Senselessness 9

“That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.” (2.1511)

1. Wittgenstein’s world
Most people believe that the world is made up of things. Philosophical dispute then
arises as to whether those things are material objects, sense impressions, ideas, instantiations,
posits, constructions, or something else.

Some ambitious philosophers also include

properties, forms, relations, or concepts, which – usually – are understood as categorically
distinct from things.

Wittgenstein rejects the position of the ontologically gluttonous by

espousing a thoroughgoing nominalism, but, paradoxically, he also rejects the thingontology: “(1) The world is all that is the case. (1.1) The world is the totality of facts, not
things.” 10 This is not to say that Wittgenstein denies that there are things. Rather, things
can only exist as combined into facts. They are metaphysically exhausted through being so
combined, and they contribute nothing else to the world. A traditional view, if willing to
posit facts at all, would most likely take them to be exhausted through their being
combinations of things. 11
Proposition (1) contains a separate important point: that the world is all that is the
case. It appears again in 1.1 with the “totality” of facts. In 1.11 Wittgenstein finally adds the

I translate “sinnlos” as “senseless”, instead of the usual “lacks a sense.”
When passages quoted from the Tractatus or Prototractatus span multiple numbered remarks, number citations
occur inside quotation marks.
11 This position is in stark contrast to much contemporary metaphysics, revolving around Tarskian truth-based
semantics. According to this view, all we need to posit is what falls in the domain of our quantifiers, and we
can construct a semantics for canonical expression while quantifying only over sequences of objects and taking
an extensionalist view of relations between them. That is, only objects need to exist for our sentences to be
true. This is precisely the opposite of Wittgenstein’s theory of truth, which revolves around facts and
propositions, neither of which have any place at all in the Tarskian view.
9

10
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emphasis himself: “The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.”
The point here is that the world is not just another thing, or another fact – it is a totality of
facts. As we are told at 1.2, it divides into facts, each of which “can be the case or not be the
case while everything else remains the same.” (1.21)
Facts are separate entities which together constitute the world, but they are declared
here (and again in 2.061-2.062) to be independent of one another. The question before us is:
how can facts be both independent and related to one another? Let “P” indicate “water is
heavier than ice” and “Q” indicate “Wittgenstein is the author of the Tractatus.” These two
facts are independent of each other in the sense that it is possible for each of them to be the
case independently of the other. 12 If ice were to sink Wittgenstein could still have written
the Tractatus. But, in order for us to be able to talk about both of them, to say “P is the case
and Q is not the case,” there must be some connection – a logical connection – between
them, which allows them to be considered in relation to one another. 13 In order for the facts
to determine a world they must be related to each-other; this relation is a purely logical
relation. Thus Wittgenstein is simultaneously an atomist and a holist, but in different
domains: with regard to everything which is contingent (whether or not the facts actually are
the case), facts are atomistic, but there must still be some necessary logical connection between
them. What this necessary connection is will be explained presently.

Wittgenstein rejects belief in the causal nexus as “superstition.” (5.136-5.1361) His positive account of
causality parallels the present point about logic: it gives a form for describing the world, it is not something true
of the world. (6.32-6.321)
13 The point is similar to that made by Kant in § 16 of the Critique of Pure Reason, where he argues that all of our
representations, even if independent of one another, must stand in a necessary relation to our selfconsciousness, so that we can consider them as our own representations and they can form a totality. (B 132133) (Throughout this thesis the first Critique will be cited according to the standard A/B pagination.)
12
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What I’ve said so far is not entirely accurate; we need to understand Wittgenstein’s
technical terminology. 14 In proposition 2, he begins to abandon the ordinary use of “fact”
and gives it a definition: “What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.”
Note the plural. Facts are, more or less, what we might immediately associate with the term:
the book being on the table, New York being in America, water being heavier than air, etc…
Consider the fact that New York is in America. This is complex – in order for it to be the
case there has to be an America, and there has to be a New York. Furthermore, both of
these entities can only exist if a number of other facts obtain: the geography, the
architecture, the law, etc… all have to stand in certain relations to one another in order for
this fact to exist. Dissecting a fact (or a proposition which expresses a fact) in this way is
called analysis. 15
According to Wittgenstein, states of affairs are what we find when this process
comes to an end. States of affairs are simple facts; facts are groups of states of affairs in
logical relation to one another. Wittgenstein draws a similar distinction between “things”
and “objects.” Just as macro facts consist of complex things, atomic states of affairs consist
of simple objects that “fit into one another like links of a chain” (2.03). 16 States of affairs are
not simply a list of objects; they stand to one another in a determinate way (2.031) 17 and “the

14 Ramsey wrote while staying with Wittgenstein, “Some of his sentences are intentionally ambiguous having an
ordinary meaning and a more difficult meaning which he also believes.” (in LCK 78)
15 This obviously stems from Russell. While the paradigm of Russellian analysis was first established in his
1905 “On Denoting”, his use of it in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918) is much closer to Wittgenstein’s.
The most important difference is that Russell’s view is empiricist. Pears’ introduction contains a good discussion
of Russell’s relationship to Wittgenstein in this work, seeing them as exemplifying the traditional empiricist and
rationalist categories. (Pears 1985, 1-34)
16 Wittgenstein writes of this remark to C.K. Ogden, reinforcing the nominalism in his view, “Here instead of
“hang on one another” it should be “hang one in another” as the links of a chain do! The meaning is that there
isn’t anything third that connects the links but that the links themselves make connection with one another. So if
“in” in this place is English please put it there. If one would hang on the other they might also be glued
together.” (LCK 23)
17 This type of “hanging together” needs to be sharply distinguished from things relating to another in what we
call a “relation” (particularly as it occurs in Russell’s “theory of relations”); although the distinction is often
blurred in translation, in German Wittgenstein always uses different words for the two: “Beziehung” for the
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determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the
state of affairs.” (2.032) Macro facts are not independent of one another: a macro fact is
only true if the members of a set of other facts have certain truth-values; but states of affairs
are independent of one another.
Just as what I said early about facts really only applied to states of affairs, what was
said about things applies only to objects. For it is objects, understood as the logically simple
constituents of the world (2.02), which are “metaphysically exhausted” through being in
states of affairs. “Things” is a more general term; it refers to objects, but also to those more
mundane things that we call “things.” The important difference between the two is that the
more mundane things are complexes, that is, they just are sets of facts. 18 This book that is on
the table is actually just the conjunction of a whole series of facts. By stating how each bit of
paper and ink relates to each other bit, and then how each fiber in the paper relates to each
other fiber, etc… we describe the book completely. 19 Eventually this analysis reaches the
states of affairs made up of simple objects.
Earlier I argued that Wittgenstein is both an atomist and a holist; it is in this
relationship shared by states of affairs in logical space that this becomes clear. And this
relationship is explained with objects. Wittgenstein writes at 2.0122, “Things are independent
in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of
connection with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear
in two different roles: by themselves, and in a proposition.)” The facts P and Q are
independent of one another in that the objects that make them up might, or might not, stand
relationship between objects in states of affairs, and “Relation” for “relation.” Pears and McGuinness
occasionally also translate the former as “relation,” which can cause confusion.
18 See 2.0201 and 3.4
19 Note that I have given a physical analysis of the book. I have done so only for simplicity; Wittgenstein
nowhere requires that analysis of material objects be physical. The constituent facts might also involve the role
a book plays (i.e. is written, is read, etc..).
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to one another in such a way that the facts exist. But they are logically connected through the
fact that objects can occur in them, for “Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities
are its facts.” (2.0121) This possibility of occurring in a state of affairs – the necessary (2.012)
and internal (2.01231) properties of an object – is what is dealt with by logic. Consequently,
Wittgenstein calls it an object’s logical form. (2.0141)
It would be difficult to elucidate his metaphysics completely while relying only on the
explicit discussion thereof. The parenthetical remark from 2.0122 quoted in the previous
paragraph, which seems somewhat out of place, gives us a hint about where to look in order
to make these views clear. In that passage he is discussing metaphysics, but he makes a
remark about words and propositions. We have seen so far that the world is made up of
facts, not things, and that facts reduce logically to states of affairs, which consist of logically
simple objects. Precisely this same structure is present in language, and so we can turn to
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in order to fill in the rest.

2. Truth, falsity, and representation of sense
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning is first and foremost a representational theory,
spelled out through the notion of picturing.

In its most basic form, the idea is that

propositions are meaningful because they picture facts in the world: the proposition “the cup
is on the table” pictures, or represents, the cup being on the table. The fact that is pictured is
part of what Wittgenstein calls the sense of a proposition.
The most obvious problem with this view is this: what if the cup isn’t on the table?
This is a problem for both negative and false propositions. 20 If a proposition represents a
fact, and it isn’t a fact that a cup is on the table, it isn’t clear what the proposition could
Russell was still working on this problem in 1918, unwilling to decide whether or not to posit negative facts.
(PLA, 74-79)
20
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represent. Wittgenstein was plagued by this problem in the early stages of the development
of the picture theory, writing, “That shadow which the picture as it were casts upon the
world: How am I to get an exact grasp of it? Here is a deep mystery. It is the mystery of
negation: This is not how things are, and yet we can say how things are not.” (NB 30)
In the Tractatus, he addresses this problem with the notion of logical space. A
situation in logical space can be understood as analogous to an object in physical space, with
a crucial caveat: whereas physical space is composed of actual situations, logical space is
composed of possible situations. 21 By making all pictures – true and false – represent only
possible situations, the unique problem for false propositions disintegrates. This sentiment is
expressed at 2.22: “What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or
falsity.” A proposition pictures a possible fact – whether it is true or false – and then after we
know which possible fact it pictures do we look to see if the fact is actual. In other words,
only once we know what the picture pictures, we can ask whether it is a true or a false
picture.
It might seem that, instead of addressed the problem for false propositions,
Wittgenstein has made true ones problematic as well. The issue was that there is nothing in
the actual world to be represented by a false or negative proposition. Declaring the nonexistent situation to be just as possible as the existent one doesn’t explain what it is that is
represented by a picture; in fact, it explicitly states that there isn’t anything actual that is
represented. The question is this: how can we picture possibility?
Imagine a world composed of just six objects, named “a,” “b,” “c,” “d,” “e,” and
“f.” For simplicity, let us assume that the only possible combinations of objects are in pairs,

Also logical space isn’t limited to the material world; Wittgenstein neither affirms nor denies the existence of
abstract facts.
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and that all pairs of non-identical objects are possible combinations. A map of logical space
could then look something like this: 22
a

b

a

c

d

e

f

X

b
c
d

X

e
f

X

This map depicts what Wittgenstein calls reality. The actual part of reality (those boxes
marked with an “X”) is the world. If it seems strange that he would call all possible states of
affairs reality, note that all of the objects actually exist, just not in all possible combinations. 23
Objects are the substance of the world (2.021): they “are what is unalterable and subsistent;
their configuration is what is changing and unstable.” (2.0271) It is precisely this that
explains false pictures: they picture possible combinations of actual objects: “in a proposition
a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment.” (4.031) Which simple objects
exist is never in flux; all change in the world is the result of objects combining and
recombining. Because all pictures latch on to the substance of the world, even false pictures
represent reality. Understanding a false picture, then, is to know that the actual objects
mentioned could be in the situation that is pictured. To check whether or not that situation is
the case is not to come to understand the picture, but to check its truth-value.

Fogelin uses a similar sort of table. See Fogelin (1995), 8.
It would be a mistake to see Wittgenstein as affirming that all possible worlds therefore share the same
ontology (as is the case for most modal systems which treat only of logical necessity). The reason is that
Wittgenstein’s ontology – and his semantics – is fact based, not object based, and which possible facts exist is
exactly what varies from world to world. Objects are the substance of the world, not what makes it up.
22
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The explanation is easily extended to negative pictures. I said earlier that the fact
pictured is part of what Wittgenstein calls the sense of a proposition. It is only a part because
whether the picture is intended affirmatively or negatively is included in the sense of the
picture. As Ansombe explains the point, we could hold up a picture of the book on the
table and say either “this is how things are” or “this is how things aren’t”. (Ansombe 1959,
69) Or, as is more common, we could just say “the book is on the table” or “the book is not
on the table.” Thus Wittgenstein says at 4.0621: “But it is important that the signs ‘p’ and
‘~p’ can say the same thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign
‘~’… The propositions ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one
and the same reality.” The same point is already given in the 1913 Notes on Logic: “In my
theory p has the same meaning as not-p but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact.” (NB
95) 24
Thus while truth and falsity are completely independent of a proposition’s pictorial
status, positive and negative assertion are essential to it. This is the point of the aphorism
“Names are like points; propositions like arrows – they have sense.” (3.144) Even more
clearly, and introducing us to the notion of showing, Wittgenstein writes, “A proposition shows
how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.” (4.022) The sense of a
proposition is the possibility of affirmation or negation of a possible fact situated in logical
space. An affirmative proposition is true if the fact does exist, viz. if the objects are so
combined; it is false otherwise. A negative proposition is true if the objects are not so
combined.

Stated in this way, the position is a critique of Frege’s notion of sense. This issue will be addressed directly in
section 4 of chapter II.
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3. Logical form: from sense to nonsense
Much of the beauty of the Tractatus lies in its being both painstakingly complex and
remarkably simple. Nowhere is this clearer than in Wittgenstein’s explanation of how a
picture represents a fact. The thesis is simple: a picture “reaches right out” to reality. This
occurs through a correlation of the names in the picture and the objects in the state of affairs
– these correlations are, in his words, “the feelers of the picture’s elements, with which the
picture touches reality.” (2.1515) Explaining this passage to C.K. Ogden, Wittgenstein
writes, “here by ‘Fühler’ I mean the things which a butterfly has.” (LCK 24) A proposition
lands on reality, so to speak, making contact with a particular part of it. He calls this
correlation the pictorial relationship. [Abbildende Beziehung]. 25 But beneath this relationship lies a
subtle distinction between form and structure. And it is here that picturing is really explained.
Let us have another glance at the map of logical space from the previous section,
with a few small changes:
a

b

a

c

d

e

f

X

b
c
d

X

e
f

X

Logical space is depicted by the map as a whole without any of the Xs filled in. Reality is the
whole map but with the Xs filled in. The world consists of only the boxes marked with an X;
25 As with the relationship among objects in a state of affairs, pictorial relationships (also called “Beziehungen”
– see note 13) are distinguished from relations proper. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s famous criticism of Russell’s
relational theory of judgment draws precisely this distinction. Hanks (2007) gives an excellent treatment of this
criticism, arguing that it is based on Wittgenstein’s demand for the unity of a proposition, and not on type
theory (as has often been supposed).
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in this case the states of affairs ac, de, and fb. In other words: logical space is the totality of
possibilities.

Reality is the totality of possibilities plus the determination of which

possibilities are actual. And the world is the totality of actualities (all that is the case).
This map leaves only certain possibilities open (symbolized by the white boxes). Any
combination of an object with itself, plus the combinations af, be, da, and fc are impossible;
all of the rest are allowed. Some objects are able to combine in both directions (i.e. ab and
ba), while some aren’t (fa is legitimate, af isn’t). In this map, I have arbitrarily stipulated the
logical form of the objects, but in reality form is not arbitrary. Wittgenstein holds that the
logical form of an object is “written into the thing itself.” (2.012) Being spatial, temporal,
musical, or colored are forms of objects. Wittgenstein expresses this at 2.0131: “A speck in
the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some color; it is, so to speak,
surrounded by color space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the sense of touch some
degree of hardness, and so on.” We saw already that objects make up the unalterable
substance of the world, and now that the form of an object is internal to it. The form is the
essence of the object; it makes the object what it is. Therefore substance “is form and
content”; (2.025) it is the objects themselves plus their possible combinations in logical space.
Wittgenstein asserts at 2.141 that “a picture is a fact” and then at 2.15 elaborates the
notion of picturing:
That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way,
represents that the things are so combined with one another.
This connection of the elements of the pictures is called its structure, and the
possibility of this structure is called the form of representation of the picture.
A picture is a fact with a certain structure, and this fact represents another fact that has the
same structure. If we were to add a language to the world depicted in our map, we would
need to also include the names (which are objects too) “a”, “b”, and so on. Then “ab”
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would picture ab; “df” would picture df. But if this explains what a picture is, it doesn’t
explain how a picture pictures. And in a sense, the answer is quite simple: “a” is correlated
with a; “b” with b, etc… Recall that these correlations of names with objects are the
“feelers… with which the picture touches reality.” If we ignore that left/right seems to be a
complex relation, “ab” pictures ab because “a” is correlated with a, “b” with b, and in the
picture “ab” “a” stands to the right of “b,” just as their objects stand to each-other in the
state of affairs.
We appear to have a complete explanation of picturing – one structure represents
another through a correlation of names with objects. But Wittgenstein continues in 2.15,
“What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly
or incorrectly – in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.” (2.17) So far we have left form
entirely out of the picture. But it is clear that Wittgenstein sees it playing some role in the
process. As he put it in 1929, “I have said elsewhere that a proposition ‘reaches up to
reality’, and by this I meant that the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the
proposition which is about these entities.” (RLF 34) There are two reasons why the simple
explanation using only structure above is inadequate.
The first was already indicated in the previous section: if a picture is to represent a
situation that doesn’t actually exist, the elements of the picture must be correlated with
actual objects, and furthermore, those objects must have the possibility of being combined like
the elements of the picture. And since both affirmation and negation are part of the sense in
addition to the situation pictured, for all sentences, the picturing is made possible by a
common form. Only after this form has allowed a situation to be pictured can we ask about
the truth or falsity of a sentence. And “asking about the truth or falsity of a sentence” is
precisely looking at the objects in the world to see if they are so combined, that is, looking to
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see if they have that structure. Form is the possibility of structure, and propositions represent
possibility.

If we restrict ourselves to structure, the solution to the problem of false

sentences dissolves.
The second reason form is important is pointed out by Ramsey (1923, 271-274) and
was more recently addressed by Ricketts (1999, 73-75). As we move from elementary
propositions and states of affairs to every-day sentences and facts, all similarity of structure
seems to dissolve. The way that the words “cup” and “table” are related in the proposition
“the cup is on the table” bears absolutely no similarity to the relation between the cup and
the table in the corresponding fact. And Wittgenstein does think of everyday sentences as
pictures. (4.011) He says at 4.016: “In order to understand the essential nature of a
proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes.
And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to depiction.”
What is “essential to depiction” is having pictorial form in common. As Ricketts puts it, “In
order for names to go proxy for objects in sentences, it must be fixed what possibilities of
combinations of names into sentences present what possibilities of combinations of objects
into states of affairs.” (Ricketts 1999, 75) These possibilities are an object’s, and a name’s,
logical form.
We can explain what this notion of “fixing” appealed to by Ricketts by returning to
our simple language from above. As it stands, “af” refers to af, “cd” to cd, etc… But we
could, for example, reverse this relationship, such that “af” refers to fa. The point is that the
form, not the structure, of the proposition is important. By reversing this relationship we
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dissolve any relationship of structure between “af” and “fa”, but we are still able to picture
the fact because we have fixed which possibilities correspond to which possibilities. 26
Wittgenstein explanation of the point uses geometrical metaphor of projection. (3.113.13; see also 4.011-4.0141) His explanation of projection in the 1929 Some Remarks on Logical
Form is particularly clear:
Let us imagine two parallel planes, I and II. One plane I figures are drawn, say,
ellipses and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce
images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others,
of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of projection – say that of orthogonal
projection or any other – and then proceed to project all figures from I onto II,
according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule
that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as
a square in II… Of course, from these images the exact shapes of the original
figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred. We can only gather from them
that the original was an ellipse or a rectangle. In order to get in a single instance at
the determinate shape of the original we would have to know the individual method
by which, e.g., a particular ellipse is projected into the circle before me. The case of
ordinary language is quite analogous. (RLF 20)
The first method of projection would be analogous to the relationship between elementary
propositions and states of affairs; the second corresponds to the more complex relationship
between ordinary propositions and facts. It is slightly deceptive to talk about fixing these
projection rules, because it is not something that we explicitly choose to do. “The tacit
conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously
complicated.” (4.002) How our language actually developed is, for Wittgenstein, an empirical
– not a philosophical or logical – question. But, in order for propositions to be able to
picture possible facts at all, these “tacit conventions” must serve as rules of projection which
map our propositions onto facts.

26 Janik and Toulmin stress this point, translating “Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen” (2.1) as “we construct
for ourselves pictures of facts”, stressing the active role. (1973, 144; 183-184) The point stems from Engelmann
(1976), 99-101.
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Wittgenstein uses this idea to define nonsense.

With regard to elementary

propositions the explanation is remarkably simple: in our map of logical space some states of
affairs were “prohibited” – they weren’t contained within the forms of the objects. There
the explanation is forced, in that I arbitrarily shaded in some boxes. But let us imagine that
we had adjusted our language such that “a” stands for b, “b” stands for c, and so on. Now
imagine that we were to say “af”. Since the objects stop at f, our new rules of projection
assign no meaning to the sign “f”. We might have stipulated that it loops back and stands for
a, but we didn’t. “af” is therefore a bit of nonsense. We can define nonsense, then, as a
string of signs 27 that violates logical form – there are no rules governing their combination.
When we extend this definition to ordinary language the situation becomes much
more ambiguous. Because the conventions that project our propositions onto reality are
tacit, we are prone to use words in improper ways. “The reason why ‘Socrates is identical’
means nothing is that there is no property called ‘identical.’ The proposition is nonsensical
because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in
itself, would be illegitimate.” (5.473) We simply haven’t conventionally stipulated any
meaning for “identical” as an adjective; we haven’t fixed a possibility of its being combined
so as to correspond to a possible fact. The proposition is therefore nonsense. But there is
one more complication for ordinary language.

It was already noted that ordinary

propositions and ordinary facts reduce to elementary propositions and states of affairs. It
follows that whether or not a proposition is nonsense will always – even in the case of
ordinary propositions – depend on the elementary ones. Wittgenstein explains this with the
notion of the truth-function.
27 Wittgenstein distinguishes between sign and symbol. A sign is a written or spoken piece of language that
doesn’t necessarily stand in any representational relation; a symbol is “any part of a proposition that
characterizes its sense.” A proposition is itself a symbol. (3.31) Therefore nonsense can only be composed of
signs, not symbols.

32
4. Truth-functions: from sense to senselessness
Wittgenstein says at 5, “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)” But the account of the truthfunctional nature of propositions actually begins a bit before 5, starting with the introduction
of a truth-possibility, which is simply the possibility of a proposition’s being true or false. The
truth-possibilities for an elementary proposition are the existence and non-existence of its
single corresponding state of affairs – it thus has two truth-possibilities, which we can
symbolize by (T) and (F). At 4.4 Wittgenstein says, “A proposition is an expression of
agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities of elementary propositions,” which is
simply to say that a complex proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions,
understood as pictures. The complex proposition “p & q” has four truth-possibilities: (TT),
(TF), (FT), and (FF); only in the first case is the whole proposition true. “p → q” has the
same truth-possibilities, but is true in all cases except the second. To return to the previous
example, “that book is on the table” is true only if all of the constituent propositions
mentioned above are true. “Page 2 is on top of page 3,” “the cover surrounds the pages,”
etc… have to be true for it to be that book; similar constituent propositions are required for
the table, and perhaps also for the relation “is on.” Those constituent propositions are also
truth-functions of simpler propositions, and so on, all the way down to simple
concatenations of names (elementary propositions).
There are two extreme cases of truth-functions:
In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of
the elementary propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological.
In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truthconditions are contradictory.
In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction.
(4.46)
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Each proposition is either true or false. If it is an elementary proposition this is the end of
the story. But for complex propositions the truth-tables become important. Complex
propositions are also simply either true or false, but there are different ways in which they can
be true or false. These are symbolized by the various lines on the truth-table.

If all of

those combinations yield truth, the proposition is a tautology; if they all yield falsehood, the
proposition is a contradiction.

Here there is no ambiguity, and on this point alone

Wittgenstein deserves much credit, as it is the first explicit logical definition of tautology, 28
achieved through the introduction of the truth-tables. 29
There are two explicit discussions of tautology and contradiction in the Tractatus; one
in terms of the picture theory, and one in terms of truth-functions. Let us begin with the
truth-functional account.

The remarks follow a discussion of what it means for one

proposition to follow from another, which is deeply rooted in the truth-functional nature of
propositions. This discussion begins at 5.11: “If all the truth-grounds 30 that are common to
a number of propositions are at the same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then
we say that the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of the others.”
Wittgenstein’s intention is to eliminate the need for inference rules – to show that one
proposition’s following from another is the result of an internal relation between the
propositions. 31 For example, “p → q” and “-p v q” follow from each-other not because of

Russell wrote even in 1919, “For the moment, I do not know how to define ‘tautology.’” This passage
contains a footnote: “The importance of ‘tautology for a definition of mathematics was pointed out to me by
my former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was working on the problem. I do not know whether he has
solved it, or even whether he is alive or dead.” (Russell 1919, 205) He expresses the same importance of, and
the same inability to define, tautology in PLA 107-108.
29 E.L. Post had also come up with the truth-tables independently; furthermore, the idea was already in Frege in
all its essentials, in that he defines the logical connectives through truth-conditions (BGS 115-124).
Nonetheless, neither of them connected the definitions to tautology or contradiction, precisely because neither
of them noticed the extreme importance of tautology and contradiction.
30 “Truth-grounds” are “those truth-possibilities of [a proposition’s] truth-arguments that make it true.” (5.101)
31 He says at 5.132, “The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions. They
themselves are the only possible justification of the inference. ‘Laws of inference’, which hare supposed to
28
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an inference rule, but because both are true in all cases except when p is true and q is false.
Likewise, “p” follows from “p & q”, because the only truth-ground for the latter is when
both p and q are true, in which case p is also true. But “p & q” doesn’t follow from “p”,
because the only truth-ground for “p” (“p” being true) leaves open both truth-possibilities of
“q”.
First consider 5.14, about which the tautology propositions are comments: “If one
proposition follows from another, then the latter says more than the former, and the former
less than the latter” (supposing they aren’t equivalent). Then Wittgenstein says, “A tautology
follows from all propositions: it says nothing”. (5.142) Imagine a proposition with the smallest
possible sense; it says something so simple that it can’t be broken into parts (an elementary
proposition). Call it “p”. The intuition here is simple – from “p” we can still infer the
tautology “p v ~p”, but by the explanation of logical implication given above, this means
that “p v ~p” must be contained in “p”. Since one can say nothing simpler than an
elementary proposition, it follows that “p v ~p” must say nothing.
With contradictions the situation becomes slightly more complicated. With the
distinctive restlessness of the Notebooks, Wittgenstein points out a problem:
But then! Won’t contradiction now be the proposition that says the most? From ‘p
& ~p’ 32 there follows not merely ‘p’ but also ‘~p’! Every proposition follows from
them and they follow from none?! …
But if contradiction is the class of all propositions, then tautology becomes what is
common to any class of propositions that have nothing in common and vanishes
completely. (Notebooks 54)
This final remark is similar to what he says in 5.143, which is quite a puzzling passage:
“Contradiction is that common factor of propositions which no proposition has in common

justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.” This issue
will receive much more attention in chapter III.
32 Throughout I will use the modern notation for conjunction in place of the Russellian “p.q”.
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with another.” How can something be a common factor of propositions which have
nothing in common? Wouldn’t the common factor just be something had in common?
Take an elementary proposition “p”. This is had in common by “p & q” and “p &
r”. This is what it means for two propositions (“p & q” and “p & r”) to have one (“p”) in
common. 33

What proposition could no propositions have in common with another?

Obviously a contradiction; the only proposition from which a contradiction follows is a
contradiction. Thus while no propositions have contradictions in common, we can still talk
of them as being a “common factor” of all propositions, since contradictions are the only
proposition which none have in common – they lie outside all others.
Finally, the truth-functional explanation of tautology and contradiction is this:
“Contradiction, one might say, vanishes outside all propositions: tautology vanishes inside
them. Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at
their center.” (5.143) (And we might add that “the middle point of a circle can be conceived
as its inner boundary.”) (NB 54) If we take the totality of all propositions, tautology forms
their inner boundary, while contradiction forms the outer. In this sense tautology and
contradiction are limiting cases of propositions.
Wittgenstein’s account of tautology and contradiction in terms of the picture theory
is much clearer. We can explain it using a map of logical space, but since only a complex
proposition can be tautologous or contradictory, the previous map of states of affairs and
elementary propositions is no longer adequate.

Wittgenstein provides a new spatial

metaphor:
The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to the
facts.

33

This discussion draws some on Black (1964), 246.
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(A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid body that
restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, like a space
bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.) (4.463)
Let our new complex logical space be composed of three possible states of affairs, p, q, and
r. Because of the logical holism outlined in the section 1, “the force of a proposition reaches
through the whole of logical space.” (3.42) Our map should look like this:

p&q&r

~p & ~q & r

p & ~q & ~r

~p & ~q & ~r

~p & q & r

p & ~q & r

~p & q & ~r

p & q & ~r

Assume the proposition “p” is true; the range left open to the facts is:

p&q&r

~p & ~q & r

p & ~q & ~r

~p & ~q & ~r

~p & q & r

p & ~q & r

~p & q & ~r

p & q & ~r

In the “positive sense” four possibilities are left open – by affirming “p” we leave these
boxes white. In the “negative sense” four possibilities are closed – by negating “p” we fill in
those boxes. Each proposition leaves open and closes some boxes; in so doing it determines
a range left open for other facts.
Now what happens when we try a tautology or a contradiction? Wittgenstein says,
A tautology leaves open to reality the whole – the infinite whole – of logical space; a
contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus
neither of them can determine reality in any way. (4.463)
And this is now quite clear: “p v ~p” will leave the whole space white; “p & ~p” will make it
black. Tautologies simply say nothing; contradictions try to say everything, and in so doing
they say nothing. Thus neither of them can represent reality.
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One might protest, “but surely we can distinguish ‘it is raining and it isn’t’ from ‘the
table is there and it isn’t.’” 34 In other words, isn’t there a distinction between different
tautologies and different contradictions? To see why not, let us return to the logical holism
expressed at 3.42:
A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole
of logical space must already be given by it.
(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.; would introduce more and
more new elements – in co-ordination.)
(The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of
a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space.)
Each state of affairs either is or isn’t the case – there is no third possibility, and so at all
times logical space should be seen as boxes filled with all elementary propositions. The map
always remains the same, and every tautology and every contradiction effects the map in
precisely the same way.
If we symbolize “it is raining” as “p” and “the table is there” as “q”, then their
respective tautologies would be “p v ~p” and “q v ~q.” The objection that we can
distinguish two tautologies amounts to asking why “p v ~p” has anything to do with “q.”
The answer is that it does have nothing to do with “q”, but neither does “q v ~q”. Both of
them, in virtue of leaving all boxes open, say nothing about any of the particular boxes.
Every tautology says nothing, therefore every tautology says the same thing. (6.11)
We can define senselessness as a string of signs that possesses a form but has no
content. A proposition with sense has a logical form, and by sharing that form with a
situation in logical space it is able to picture it. But though the picturing cancels out in
contradiction and tautology, the form of the proposition remains, and therefore tautologies
and contradictions show that they say nothing. If we understand the symbols “p” “&” and
34

Moore does protest; see Moore (1954), 65-69.
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“~”, and we understand their form – their possible combinations – then we see that “p & ~p”
says nothing. In this way, tautology and contradiction “are the limiting cases – indeed the
disintegration – of the combination of signs.” (4.466) They are the “disintegration” of the
combination signs because their internal structure turns them from symbols (which are
meaningful) to pure signs (which aren’t).
But tautology and contradiction can show much more than that they are tautology
and contradiction. Because the propositions of logic are tautologies (6.1), the dissolution of
sense obtains a central position in the Tractatus. Thus in addressing Wittgenstein’s logic, the
next two chapters of this thesis are concerned with further implications of tautology and
contradiction. The purpose of the book is to draw a limit to thought and language. We see
from Wittgenstein’s remark that tautology and contradiction are the “limiting cases – indeed
the disintegration – of the combination of signs” (4.466, emphasis mine) that it is in
tautology and contradiction that this limit is drawn. That is, the limit is drawn in logic. In
chapter III I will address his logic directly. Before getting there the next chapter will locate
Wittgenstein’s logic historically against the background of Kant and Frege.
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II. A Transcendental Theory of Symbolism
In order for a proposition to be true it must first and foremost be capable of truth, and that is all
that concerns logic. (NB 20)

1. Kant’s logics
In some of the most beautiful prose in the history of philosophy, the Preface to the
first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason laments the confused and dogmatic state of
metaphysics, the fallen Queen of the sciences. In an attempt to return the matron to her
title, Kant calls for a perspectival revolution in philosophy. He proposes that reason look to
itself in order to investigate what it brings to experience. In this way, Kant hopes to give the
a priori and necessary preconditions for empirical knowledge, and thereby determine the
limits of pure reason, beyond which it inevitably falls into incoherence or contradiction.
Judgments are divided into (i) those which are either a posteriori judgments or give necessary
a priori conditions for them, and (ii) those a priori judgments which transcend all possible
experience. By exhaustively characterizing it, (i) is delineated from (ii), and the limit of pure
reason is drawn. 35 Kant’s task is thus “to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its
lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in
accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws.” (A xi) “This tribunal,” Kant
continues, “is no other than the Critique of Pure Reason.”
In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein states a similar purpose for his work: to
draw a limit to thought. Like Kant, his task is not to simply give a list of propositions and
then divide them into those with and without sense. He argues that philosophy “(4.114)
Kant does also give a sustained account of how and why we are compelled “by our very nature” to go beyond
(i) in the transcendental dialectic.
35
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must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be
thought. (4.115) It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.”
Kant’s method is to explain clearly and exhaustively what judgments are possible a priori. By
working outward through the legitimate judgments, Kant shows that any attempt to go
beyond them falls into contradiction. The method of both philosophers is to give the
necessary preconditions for the legitimate side of their border (the knowable for Kant, the
sayable for Wittgenstein).
The most important difference is that, to accomplish this task, Kant creates
transcendental logic and argues for the existence of synthetic a priori judgments, whereas
Wittgenstein insists that his limit-drawing must restrict itself to what Kant calls pure general
logic, which is analytic. This chapter will argue that Wittgenstein is able to so restrict himself
because of Frege’s technical advances in logic, and Wittgenstein’s inversion of Frege’s notion
of sense. But first we must understand the Kantian task more fully, and the role that logic
plays in it.
Kant draws a distinction between pure general logic and transcendental logic.
Regarding the former, Kant gives two rules “which logicians must always bear in mind.” Let
us deal with them in turn:
(1) As general logic, it abstracts from all content of the knowledge of understanding
and from all differences in its objects, and deals with nothing but a mere form of
thought. (B 78)
One of Kant’s most original and enduring contributions is his distinction between sensibility
and understanding: the two springs which together yield knowledge. With the first we are
affected by objects (given sense experience), through the second we think them (cognize it).
The import of (1) is that pure general logic stands in relation only to the understanding, and
is therefore constituted of “thoughts without content,” that is, empty thoughts. (B 75) It is
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through sensibility (either empirical or pure intuition) that we receive content; general logic
abstracts from it. Kant writes, “General logic abstracts from all content of knowledge, that
is, from all relation of knowledge to its object, and considers only the logical form in the
relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in
general.” (B 79) In logic reason deals only with itself; in so doing it remains empty.
Kant’s second rule is:
(2) As pure logic, it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and does not, as has
sometimes been supposed, borrow anything from psychology, which therefore has
no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. Pure logic is a body of
demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain entirely a priori. (B 78)
This rule differentiates pure general logic from transcendental logic. It also anticipates
Frege’s campaign against psychologism. 36 General logic is entirely empty – without object.
Transcendental logic, on the other hand, is able to address the relationship between a
judgment and its object. It can do so with regard to pure modes of knowledge, that is,
knowledge of objects which are thought entirely a priori. (B 87) It is the treatment of such
knowledge that constitutes roughly five sixths of the entire Critique of Pure Reason. But Kant
does not deal with this knowledge itself; he deals with its possibility. (B 81) Almost everything
that is immediately associated with the first Critique, except the pure a priori forms of
sensibility (space and time), is transcendental logic.
To make our way back to Wittgenstein, consider Kant’s reason for withholding the
title “logic of truth” from general logic, but applying it to transcendental logic: “no
knowledge can contradict [transcendental logic] without at once losing all content, that is, all
relation to any object, and therefore all truth.” (B 87) This is an indication that the purpose of
36 It also, of course, has led to the charge, (often leveled against Kant), that his transcendental philosophy is
pschologistic. Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present work; I mention only that Kant is not
forced into psychologism regarding transcendental logic, since the requirement is not that it be psychologistic,
but only that it have a relation to “empirical principles,” viz. the relationship between concepts and objects.

42
Wittgenstein’s logic (and philosophy thereof) corresponds to Kant’s transcendental, not general,
logic. We saw in the previous chapter that the propositions of logic serve as the limiting case
of a proposition; on one side of the limit stand pictures whose content arises through a
correspondence between names and objects, and on the other side stand nonsensical strings
of signs with no such correspondence, that is, no content. This limit – on the wrong side of
which one loses “all relation to any object” – is drawn in transcendental logic for Kant, but
with general logic in Wittgenstein.
To sum up: Kant distinguishes between pure general logic, which is purely formal
and without content, and transcendental logic, which has content, and through which Kant
attempts to explain the possibility of all knowledge and draw the limit of pure reason.
Wittgenstein adopts the task given by Kant to transcendental logic, except his goal is to
explain the semantic possibility of truth instead of the epistemic possibility of knowledge.
For this reason, he aims to accomplish the task using only the resources of a purely formal
system. For Kant this is simply unintelligible: purely formal logic is capable of giving only a
negative criterion for truth, not any positive account. (B 82) To explain why Wittgenstein is
able to do this with a purely formal logic, we must look to Frege. In section 2, we will see
that Frege’s Conceptual Notation yields a new logic with enormous expressive power, so
much, in fact, that he rejects Kant’s view that logic is purely formal. For Frege, logic has
content. I will argue that this logic is powerful enough to allow Wittgenstein to draw his
limit using it alone. But at this point we have a Fregean logic with content; in sections 3 and 4
I will argue that, through a complete inversion of Frege’s notion of sense, Wittgenstein is
able to reinterpret Frege’s logic in accord with the Kantian view that logic is empty, while
simultaneously maintaining its expressive power.
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2. Frege’s laws of thought 37
Frege’s 1882 article “On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation” makes
the purpose of his Conceptual Notation 38 abundantly clear. The article begins:
Time and again, in the more abstract regions of science, the lack of a means of
avoiding misunderstandings on the part of others, and also errors in one’s own
thought, makes itself felt. Both short-comings have their origin in the imperfection
of language, for we do have to use sensible symbols to think. (Frege 1882, 83)
Frege’s complaint with ordinary language is founded on two dissatisfactions. The first is
ambiguity: words can have multiple meanings. “The most dangerous cases,” Frege writes,
“are those in which the meanings of a word are only slightly different, the subtle and yet not
unimportant variations.” (Ibid, 84) The paradigmatic case of such ambiguity is the lack of a
distinction between concept and object words. The word “horse,” for example, can be taken to
mean an object (as in “the horse is in the barn”) or a concept (as in “the horse is a fourlegged animal”).

The second problem with ordinary language, even with mathematical

language, is that it disguises inference. (Ibid 85; BGS 104; BL 3-5) This is Frege’s
fundamental concern in all of his logical work: to achieve perspicuity in meaning and
inference.
The most basic insight of Frege’s Conceptual Notation is what distinguishes it from
Aristotelian term logic; Frege writes, “a distinction between subject and predicate does not occur
in my way of representing a judgment.” (BGS 112) His complaint with this way of
representing a judgment is that the categories of subject and predicate are logically arbitrary.
Consider “At Plataea the Greeks defeated the Persians” and “At Plataea the Persians were

My reading of Frege is heavily influenced by Danielle Macbeth’s Frege’s Logic (2005).
“Begriffschrift” refers to the 1879 book; I leave it untranslated to keep clear that “Conceptual Notation” is to
refer to the notation that is created in Begriffschrift, but continuous throughout all of Frege’s writings. My account
of the Conceptual Notation actually follows the 1893 Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic, not Begriffschrift, where
there are differences.
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defeated by the Greeks.” (Loc. Cit.) While the two sentences have different subjects and
predicates, they express precisely the same thought.

And most importantly, both

propositions have precisely the same deductive force, or inferential role; only “that part of
the content which is the same in both” is the conceptual content of the proposition. (BGS
113)
How, though, are we to break up a proposition like “Socrates is mortal”, if not using
subject and predicate? Frege’s answer is one of the most important insights in the history of
logic: we take “Socrates” to refer to an object, and “x is mortal” to refer to a specific type of
function, which he calls a concept. Much more importantly, whereas Aristotelian term logic
draws no formal distinction between “Socrates is mortal” and “All men are mortal,” Frege
takes general expressions like “all” and “some” to be functions of functions. 39 “All men are
mortal” is analyzed as “for all things, if that thing is a man, then it is mortal.” Instead of
asserting of the (plural) subject “all men” that they are mortal, it makes an assertion about
the concepts “x is a man” and “x is mortal.” Generality is therefore a second-level function; the
first-level functions “x is a man” and “x is mortal” take objects as arguments, but are also in
turn arguments for second-level functions like “some” and “all.” (BL 73-74)
In distinguishing between objects, first-level concepts, and second-level concepts,
Frege brings out the essential difference in form between the propositions “Socrates is
mortal” and “All men are mortal.” With this distinction he gains – for the first time in the
history of logic 40 – the ability to analyze multiply general propositions such as “everyone
loves someone.” This ability unquestionably marks the most significant expanse of the
scope of logic since Aristotle. What is especially important for Frege is that he has provided
39 Kant, of course, is often attributed with having anticipated this insight in his critique of the ontological
argument (B 625-63). Frege explictitly draws this connection to the ontological argument. (FA 65)
40 Michael Beaney gives an excellent discussion of Frege’s logical achievements in relation to his
contemporaries, especially Boole, in the Introduction to The Frege Reader (Frege 1997, 10-14).

45
a means of deriving arithmetic rules of inference and axioms as logical theorems from the
basic logical axioms and definitions.
Reducing arithmetic to logic as an answer to the question “what is arithmetic?”
inevitably leads to a further question: what is logic? 41

Logic was often thought of as

providing the “laws of thought,” but whereas most natural laws are taken to be merely
descriptive, laws of thought (especially if considered as inference rules) are taken to be
prescriptive. Frege frequently addressed this distinction, but he often seems to contradict
himself. 42
Consider, first, the view that logical laws are descriptive laws of thought – that logic
is a science of truths. Frege writes, “of course all sciences have truth as their goal, but logic
is concerned with the predicate ‘true’ in a quite special way, namely in a way analogous to
that in which physics has to do with the predicates ‘heavy and ‘warm’ or chemistry with
predicates ‘acid’ and ‘alkaline.’” (PW 128) In thinking of “the True” as an object (SM 33-35;
BL 7; Frege 1891, 18), Frege allows for it to be an object of scientific investigation. The laws
of truth would be no different in principle from other scientific laws, except in that they are
ultimately general.

Along these lines, he writes in “Function and Concept” that the

difference between first-level and second-level functions is “founded deep in the nature of
things.” (Frege 1891, 31)
We find his final expression of this view in the late essay “The Thought”:
The word ‘law’ is used in two senses. When we speak of moral or civil laws we mean
prescriptions, which ought to be obeyed but with which actual occurances are not
always in conformity. Laws of Nature are general features of what happens in
nature, and occurrences in nature are always in accordance with them. It is rather in
41 This was not the central question for Frege; he was primarily a philosopher of mathematics. But he does
address this question, and as Monk explains clearly, this is the question that Wittgenstein took up against the
backdrop of Frege’s and Russell’s logicism. (Monk 1990, 41-43) My discussion of Frege therefore focuses on
his philosophy of logic and doesn’t directly address his philosophy of mathematics.
42 The following discussion draws on MacFarlane (2002), 36-43 and Macbeth (2005), 17-19.
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this sense that I speak of laws of truth. Here of course it is not a matter of what
happens but of what is. (Frege 1918, 58)
On this view, logic gives the general laws which describe the way thought actually is. But
this way of putting the matter seems to be at odds with what is perhaps Frege’s most
fundamental conviction: that under no circumstance is logic to be thought of as psychological. 43
The expression “laws of thought” could be taken to mean general descriptions of mental
processes. Indeed, what could laws of thought be, if not laws of our thoughts?
Citing precisely this looming psychologism as a reason, sometimes Frege endorses
just the opposite view: that logic is merely prescriptive, and not descriptive. In the Basic
Laws he writes, “in one sense a law asserts what is; in the other it prescribes what ought to
be. Only in the latter sense can the laws of logic be called ‘laws of thought:’ so far as they
stipulate the way in which one ought to think.” (BL 12) Frege expresses the point even more
adamantly in 1897, “The word ‘true’ can be used to indicate [the] goal for logic, just as can
‘good’ for ethics and ‘beautiful’ for aesthetics… Like ethics, logic can be called a normative
science. How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth?” (PW 128) Later in the same
essay:
We can also think of [the laws of truth] as prescriptions for making judgments; we
must comply with them in our judgments if we are not to fail of truth. So if we call
them laws of thought or, better, laws of judgment, we must not forget we are
concerned here with laws which, like the principles of morals or the laws of the state,
prescribe how we are to act, and do not, like the laws of nature, define the actual
course of events… I therefore think it better to avoid the expression ‘laws of
thought’ altogether in logic, because it always misleads us into thinking of laws of
thought as laws of nature. (PW 145) 44

43 There is hardly a completed piece of writing by Frege that does not contain a sustained discussion of this
point. It is taken as one of the fundamental principles in The Foundations of Arithmetic (FA x), and he
characterizes his whole enterprise in the preface to The Basic Laws of Arithmetic as an attempt to “contribute to a
renewal of logic” by “overthrowing psychological logic.” (BL 25)
44 Another expression of the same view is found in PW 4-5.
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These remarks stand in direct opposition to the statement above from The Thought, and also
to his view that the True and the False are objects for scientific investigation.
On this prescriptive view, Frege is in complete agreement with Kant. 45 Kant’s
logical principle was that “as pure logic, it has nothing to do with empirical principles, and
does not, as has sometimes been supposed, borrow anything from psychology, which
therefore has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding.” (B 78) In
elucidating this statement, Kant relates pure general logic to pure ethics, “which contains
only the necessary moral laws of a free will in general.” (Loc. Cit.) 46 For Kant, logic is a body
of rules, not truths. (B 82-86) For this reason, according to Kant, logic must be empty – it is
only in virtue of being wholly abstracted from all connection to sensibility that logic is able
to prescribe rules for all possible thought.
But what about Frege’s earlier statements that logic is descriptive? Continuing the
long passage quoted on the previous page, Frege achieves a synthesis of the two contrasting
views: “we could, with equal justice, think of the laws of geometry and the laws of physics as
laws of thought or judgment, namely as prescriptions to which our judgments must conform
in a different domain if they are to remain in agreement with truth.” (PW 145-146) Laws of
geometry and physics, however, are clearly also descriptive. And thus Frege’s mature view is
that the ambiguity of the word “law” corresponds to an ambiguity in laws themselves:
Any law asserting what is, can be conceived as prescribing that one ought to think in
conformity with it, and is thus in that sense a law of thought. This holds for laws of
geometry and physics no less than for laws of logic. The latter have a special title to
45 In the Vienna Logic Kant gives Frege’s argument almost verbatim, “We can divide the laws of our
understanding in the following way: 1. Rules for how we think. 2. Rules for how we ought to think. Sometimes
we think completely wrongheadedly. This use can never agree with the rules. This is the misuse of the
understanding and is excluded here… Some logicians presuppose psychology in their logic. Since this is an
empirical science, there would arise from this a science of how we think under various hindrances, not of how
we ought to think. There would be nothing but contingent and natural laws. But that is not what we are
asking about.” (Kant 1992, 252) A similar argument appears in less detail in the Jäsche Logic (Ibid, 529)
46 Kant addresses this relationship much more thoroughly in The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
(1885), 9-15.
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the name ‘laws of thought’ only if we mean to assert that they are the most general
laws, which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to
think at all. (BL 12)
All descriptive laws are simultaneously prescriptive laws of thought; by describing what
actually is they prescribe that we ought to think in accordance with them. Logical laws have
a special title to the status “laws of thought” because of their generality; whereas physical laws
describe the physical universe, and thus usher in prescriptions regarding thought only about
it, logical laws are general laws about everything whatsoever, and thus they usher in
prescriptions regarding any and all thought. 47
From this hybrid view of laws, and from the fact that Frege calls logical truths
analytic, it follows that Frege’s analyticity is distinct from Kant’s. When defining analyticity
in the Foundations, Frege claims to only explicate Kant’s own definition. 48 But much later in
the text he acknowledges the differences between their respective definitions, calling Kant’s
“too narrow.” (FA 99-100) In this later passage, Frege is discussing “the more fruitful type
of definition” in mathematics, which yields inferences that “cannot be inspected in advance.”
He argues that
The conclusions we draw from it extend our knowledge, and ought therefore, on
Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be proved by purely logical
means, and are thus analytic. The truth is that they are contained in the definitions,
but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house.”
(FA 101)
Interestingly enough, there is a section in the first Critique where Kant also addresses the
fruitfulness of mathematical definitions.

He, like Frege, takes this fruitfulness as

See also FA 20-21 and MacFarlane (2002), 36-37.
He writes in a footnote to his definition of “analytic,” “I do not, of course, mean to assign a new sense to
these terms, but only to state accurately what earlier writers, Kant in particular, have meant by them.” (FA 3)
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characteristic of mathematics, but for precisely this reason he calls them synthetic, in
contrast to philosophical “expositions” of a concept, which are analytic. (B 727-732)
It is on this point that Frege differs strikingly from both Kant and Wittgenstein.
While all three of them describe logic as “analytic,” Frege’s understanding of this term
differs from the other two. According to Wittgenstein, all that can be inferred from a
proposition is already contained in it. 49 Kant’s notion of analyticity, likewise, is characterized
by the idea of explicating what was already in a concept. Thus inference (for Wittgenstein)
and explication (for Kant) are little more than psychological aids. They help us see what was
already there. Macbeth addresses this issue, and writes that for Frege “the conclusion is
contained in the premises not implicitly, as Wittgenstein thinks, but rather potentially.
Actualizing that potential requires an inference.” (Macbeth 2002, 213) One might say that
the conclusion is, for Frege, contained in the premises together with the inference.
I claimed earlier that, with Frege’s new logic, Wittgenstein would be able to carry
through something analogous to Kant’s program of transcendental philosophy without
appealing to a separate transcendental logic. It still isn’t clear what about Frege’s logic allows
this. But if we look back to Kant’s distinction between general and transcendental logic, we
find that the essential difference between them is the way in which they deal with truth.
Regarding the former, Kant writes,
[General] logic, in so far as it expounds the universal and necessary rules of the
understanding, must in these rules furnish criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts
these rules is false… These criteria, however, concern only the form of truth, that is,
of thought in general; and in so far they are quite correct, but are not by themselves
sufficient. For although our knowledge may be in complete accordance with logical
demands, that is, may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be in
contradiction with its object. (B 84)

49 I focus the discussion of Wittgenstein’s analyticity on inference for reasons that will become clear in chapter
III section 1; in short, Wittgenstein’s “method of inference” is to combine premises and conclusion so as to
obtain an analytic statement (a tautology).
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Thus Kant insists that general logic is incapable of giving a criterion of truth that is both
necessary and sufficient. But with transcendental logic the story is different:
That part of transcendental logic which deals with the elements of pure knowledge
yielded by understanding, and the principles without which no object can be thought,
is the transcendental analytic. It is a logic of truth. For no knowledge can contradict it
without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth. (B 87;
emphasis mine)
Because Kant’s transcendental logic does address the thinking of an object (of content), it can
be thought of as a science of truth. Traditional Aristotelian term logic (what Kant meant by
“general logic”) treats only of subject and predicate, and thus Kant is forced to look outside
of general logic to explain the content of a judgment.
As a science of truth, we saw, is precisely how Frege characterizes logic – logic takes
truth as its object of study. In giving a functional analysis of the relationship between concept
and object, Frege opened up the possibility of treating the inner structure of a judgment
formally, and showed how concept and object unite to yield a truth-value. Instead of giving
only rules to which judgments must conform, Frege introductions truth-conditions; this is
precisely what Kant found wanting in pure general logic.
There is still the question of whether Kant would accept Frege’s Conceptual
Notation as logic, given that it has content. Indeed, Frege’s advance in logic, the treatment
of concept and object, is precisely what Kant claimed that logic, as logic, can’t do. Frege’s
logic does actually describe something and thereby gives the laws of thought, but a Kantian
might ask: if it doesn’t describe our psychological thinking of a thought, what does it
describe? To answer this question, Frege draws his famous distinction between sense and
meaning. 50

I translate Frege’s “Bedeutung” as “meaning.” It is usually translated as “reference,” but “nominatum” and
“meaning” are also common.
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3. Frege’s sense
Frege’s classic 1892 essay “On Sense and Meaning” begins with a puzzle about
identity: how is it that a sentence like “the morning star is the evening star” can be
informative? If the morning star really is identical with the evening star, then the sentence
seems to assert nothing more than that an object is identical with itself – an a priori truth.
But the discovery that both “the morning star” and “the evening star” correspond to the
same object – the planet Venus – was an important a posteriori discovery. Frege bridges the
epistemic gulf between trivial and informative identity statements with the notion of sense.
“The morning star” indicates a particular way of looking at the object – where it appears at a
particular time in the sky – likewise with “the evening star”. This “way of looking,” called by
Frege “the mode of presentation of that which is designated,” (SM 26) is the sense of a
referring expression. Thus, what we are told by “the morning star is the evening star” is that
the same object is presented by the two different senses. A “proper name,” then, “expresses
its sense” and “stands for or designates its meaning.” (SM 31)
The distinction isn’t limited to proper names, at least not to what we call proper
names. Frege calls any linguistic expression which means an object a proper name (SM 27),
and when coupled with his functional account of concepts, this yields a strange result. The
sense of a proposition is a thought, which is to be understood not as “the subjective
performance of thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common
property of several thinkers.” (SM 33n) Just as the sense of an expression is a mode of
presentation of its meaning, the sense of a proposition is a mode of presentation of the
proposition’s meaning.

This is where the translation of “Bedeutung” as “reference”

becomes problematic, for what could a proposition possibly refer to? A proposition means a
truth-value, says Frege, which he defines as the “circumstance that it [the thought] is true or
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false.” (SM 34) A truth value is an object, one of two: the True or the False. And just as there
are many senses with which we can mean an object, there are many thoughts with which we
can mean the True or the False.
And finally, the sense/meaning distinction is extended beyond proper names
(including propositions) to concepts. Concepts, Frege writes, “are predicative.” (Frege 1892,
193) They are incomplete – only when given an object do they become whole. But whereas,
in the Begriffschrift, this is taken to mean that concept words are not referring expressions
(BGS 128), in later writings Frege argues that concept words do denote something, namely
concepts. 51 As such, concept words must also possess a sense. Since Frege’s Conceptual
Notation is intended to allow the expression of general laws regarding the relationship
between concepts and objects, he must be able to talk about concepts. And, furthermore,
because the sense of a proposition is made up of the senses of its parts (SM 33), it follows that
all parts of the proposition must have a sense.
Thoughts – the senses of propositions – exist in an objective non-physical and nonmental realm. (SM 30; Frege 1918, 69) They are composed of unsaturated senses of concepts
and saturated senses of objects. When the sense of the thought is so constituted as to mean
the True, the proposition is true. It is false otherwise. The parts of the proposition fit
together to give truth conditions, which in turn are the meaning of the sentence. Thus it is
commonplace to read Frege as the grandfather of the contemporary notion of the more
compositional theory of meaning.

This is the primary point of Frege’s “Comments on Sinn and Bedeutung” (in Frege 1997, 172-180) and an
1891 letter to Husserl (in Frege 1980, 61-64) See also FA 63, BL 32, and Frege 1892a, 317-318.
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But perhaps the fact that nearly everyone who so reads him sees Frege as failing
miserably in his task shows that they’re on the wrong track. 52 The fundamental problem
with the traditional reading of Frege comes out in a remark of Dummett’s: “Frege’s model
of language is both rigid and static, and therefore fails to be a naturalistic portrait of ordinary
language.” (Dummett 1981, 626) Frege was well aware of the rigidity of his theory, and for
precisely that reason he was well aware that it is not a theory of natural language. Consider
the following two passages:
Ordinary language can be compared to the hand, which despite its adaptability to the
most diverse tasks is still inadequate. We build for ourselves artificial hands, tools
for particular purposes, which work with more accuracy than the hand can provide.
And how is this accuracy possible? Through the very stiffness and inflexibility of
parts the lack of which makes the hand so dextrous. Word-language is inadequate in
a similar way. We need a system of symbols from which every ambiguity is banned,
which has a strict logical form from which the content cannot escape. (Frege 1882,
86)
I believe I can make the relation of my ‘Conceptual Notation’ to ordinary language
clearest if I compare it to the relation of the microscope to the eye. The latter,
because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can
adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the
microscope. Of course, viewed as an optical instrument it reveals many
imperfections… But as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon
sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate. On the other hand, the
microscope is perfectly suited for just such purposes; but, for this very reason, is
useless for all others. (BGS 105)
These are not the remarks of a natural language theorist. 53 They are the remarks of a
logician who is interested in creating a Conceptual Notation which isolates and clearly displays
all inferential steps, which makes clear how function and argument yield truth-values, and
which explains judgment as the step from sense to meaning. In short, they are the remarks
See Dummett (1981), 584-627 for the standard expression of this reading; see Evans (1982) and Davidson
(1967) for compositional language theorists who see Frege as their forerunner, but criticize his attempt.
Macbeth is very critical of this reading of Frege: see especially Macbeth (2006), 131-155.
53 See also Frege’s letter to Husserl from October 30th, 1906: “It cannot be the task of logic to investigate
language and determine what is contained in a linguistic expression. Someone who wants to learn logic from
language is like an adult who wants to learn how to think from a child… The main task of the logician is to
free himself from language and to simplify it.” (Frege 1980, 67-68)
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of a scientist who is concerned with investigation of platonic laws of thought through a
science of the True and the False.
I will conclude, then, with Frege’s logical presentation of the sense/meaning
distinction. Consider an arithmetical function, such as “x + 2”. It takes a number as
argument, and yields a number as value, e.g. argument 2 yields value 4. In both Basic Laws
and “Function and Concept” Frege mentions that the field of possible arguments and values
for functions had recently been extended by the admission of complex numbers. (BL 35;
Frege 1891, 28) While his primary interest is arithmetic, his concern with it is to show its
ultimate generality – its close connection with the absolutely general laws of thought. (FA
21) Thus he continues this process of widening the domain and range of a function,
ultimately allowing any object to serve as the value of a function. (BL 35-36; Frege 1891, 13)
Functions map objects of any kind onto truth-values. 54
One thing stressed in nearly all of Frege’s writings – both early and late – is that a
proposition can be given various analyses into function and argument. Thus “2(3 + 1) =
2(3) + 2” can be turned into “n(3 + 1) = n(3) + 2,” which maps 2 onto the True, and
everything else onto the False. But we can also turn it into “2(3 + n) = 2(3) + 2,” which
means the True with argument 1, and the False with all others. A point stressed in the Basic
Laws is that only relative to such an analysis can we make inferences. Macbeth explains as
follows:
To infer, for instance, that Romeo admires Juliet on the grounds that Romeo loves
Juliet and that anyone who loves Juliet admires her requires analyzing ‘Romeo loves
Juliet’ into function and argument in a way that is different from that required in the
inference ‘Romeo loves Juliet; anyone who loves someone loves himself or herself;
therefore, Romeo loves himself. (Macbeth 2005, 137; see also 72-73, 76, 131-143)
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This is precisely what leads Frege into the famous “Julius Caesar” problem. See FA 68, 78.
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Just as with the mathematical proposition given above, “Romeo admires Juliet” could be
seen as “Lxj,” “Lrx,” “Lxy,” “Φrj,” and so on. Only relative to such an analysis do we
obtain truth-conditions, independent of such an analysis the proposition simply “shows how
things stand if it is true. In order to recover truth-conditions from it, we must analyze it into
function and argument.” (Ibid, 44) What is independent of such an analysis is the sense of the
proposition – the thought – which simply displays Romeo, Juliet, and the relation of loving
in a higher order relation. A proposition of the Conceptual Notation displays the thought in
such a way that it can be variously analyzed, in order that it may be used variously for
inferences.
There are thus two central elements to propositions of Frege’s Conceptual Notation;
first, the “conceptual content” of the proposition (the thought, its sense) is displayed. But
equally important is that we “move from a thought to its truth-value,” more precisely, from
sense to meaning. This dual-nature is reflected in the Notation itself, specifically in the fact
that Frege requires both the content-stroke (or the “horizontal”) and the judgment-stroke. 55 With
regard to Frege’s pre-Sense/meaning writings (e.g. Begriffschrift), Wittgenstein’s criticism of the
judgment stroke (4.442) is entirely justified – for whether or not one believes that the
sentence is true is irrelevant – the proposition simply displays truth-conditions. (BGS 114124) 56 But once Frege distinguishes the thought from its truth-value, it becomes necessary to
analyze the proposition into function and argument in order to move from sense to meaning
and make inferences, that is, it becomes necessary to make a judgment. The sense of a
proposition is its entire inferential content; relative to an analysis we can reach truth.

See Macbeth 2002, 206-220.
In this way Wittgenstein’s criticism also applies to Russell’s use of it, throughout all of his pre-Wittgenstein
logical work.
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We can see how Frege’s introduction of the logical notion of sense explains why
Frege saw logic as giving substantial laws of truth. The sense of a logical law, such as the
Basic Law IIa: “——[(x)Fx] → Fa” (BL 71), 57 simply displays a second-order logical relation
between concepts and objects. Once prefaced with the judgment stroke (“├—— [(x)Fx] →
Fa”) the law moves from sense to meaning. It moves from displaying logical relations to
making assertions about them. This law is a second level function with first level functions as
argument, and asserts of them that “what holds for all objects, holds also for any.” (Loc. Cit.)
It gives us an ultimately general account of how functions and arguments work together to
yield truth. On the reading sketched here, Frege’s project is to give just such logical laws in
order to give scientific knowledge of truth.

4. Logic’s Place in the Tractatus
Let’s recapitulate. In Kant we saw:
(1) general logic consists of judgments with no content, and
(2) transcendental logic gives necessary preconditions for knowledge.
Because of the power of his new truth-functional logic, Frege held that
(3) logic gives general truths about platonic thoughts (senses of propositions), and
(4) logic is therefore both descriptive and normative.
In this section I will argue that Wittgenstein fundamentally inverts (3) through his distinct
notion of sense, and because of this inversion he holds the following theses:
(1’) logic consists of propositions with no content,
(2’) logic gives necessary preconditions for truth,
(4’) logic is neither descriptive nor normative.
The line at the beginning is not negation, but Frege’s “horizontal,” which indicates that what follows it has
content, viz. is a thought.
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The connection between the three theses is clear: because logic is empty it is not descriptive;
because logic gives necessary preconditions for truth it is not normative.
There are some barriers to overcome.

First, holding both (1’) and (2’) seems

paradoxical. One of Kant’s most fundamental points was that (2’) could only be achieved by
synthetic a priori judgments; how could an analytic proposition be transcendental? Second,
(4’) seems paradoxical in itself.

If logic isn’t descriptive or normative, what is it?

Wittgenstein’s answer comes as a critique of Frege.
Frege holds that the meaning of a proposition is a truth-value, and that the sense of a
proposition is the mode of presentation of that truth-value (a thought). While Frege’s
thoughts are platonic entities in a non-physical/non-mental realm, they are nonetheless
closely related to Wittgenstein’s notion of a possible fact. This issue appears to be a problem
for Frege. A thought is constructed out of the senses of the constituent parts of its
proposition, which are held to stand in an internal and necessary relationship to one-another:
senses of names saturate senses of concept-words. But names and concept-words also have
meanings: an actual object and an actual concept. Thus whereas the sense of a proposition is
composed out of the senses of the parts, the meaning of the proposition is not: it is simply
the object the True or the False. The question is: what has happened to the meanings of the
parts? The only solution would be to say that they (together) are something like a fact – a
proposition refers to the True if the meanings of the parts stand in relation to one another as
the proposition says they do. If not it means the False. On this view, the meaning of a false
proposition is precisely the opposite of the meaning of a true proposition.
Wittgenstein writes in Notes on Logic, “in my theory p has the same meaning as not-p
but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact.” (NL 95) In the updated vocabulary of the
Tractatus: “The propositions ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them
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one and the same reality.” (4.0621) A neutral way to define “sense” and “meaning” for both
Frege and Wittgenstein is to say that the meaning of an expression is what is in the world that
relates to it; the sense of an expression is the method of presenting the meaning. The sense
of Frege’s proposition is the mode of presentation of the truth-value, which is the
presentation of a fact. The sense of Wittgenstein’s propositions is the mode of presentation
of the fact, which is the presentation of it as being true or false.
We have to be careful not to conflate two separate distinctions: (5) positive and
negative propositions and (6) true and false propositions. It is Wittgenstein’s treatment of
the relationship between these two distinctions that leads to his sharpest criticism of Frege.
Frege is not sensitive to (5); he does not allow for a negative assertion of a fact. Rather, in
asserting “~p” one affirms “that the content of [p] does not occur.” (BGS 120) Thus “p” and
“~p” have opposite meanings, and both are true just in case their distinct thoughts present
the True. 58
Wittgenstein finds this position untenable, because if ‘p’ and ‘~p’ determine different
facts, then it isn’t immediately clear what the connection between them is. He writes, “the
negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of the logical place of the
negated proposition. For it describes it as lying outside the latter’s logical space.” (4.0641)
Consider the logical place determined (range left open to the facts) by “p”:
p&q&r

~p & ~q & r

p & ~q & ~r

~p & ~q & ~r

~p & q & r

p & ~q & r

~p & q & ~r

p & q & ~r

The logical place determined by “~p” is different from that determined by “p”, but it is
essentially connected to it in that it is precisely the opposite logical place:
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Anscombe’s treatment of this issue is remarkably clear; see (1971), 51-78.
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p&q&r

~p & ~q & r

p & ~q & ~r

~p & ~q & ~r

~p & q & r

p & ~q & r

~p & q & ~r

p & q & ~r

In this way the two senses are fundamentally opposed to one another; if the sense of a
proposition is thought of as an arrow (3.144), then ‘p’ and ‘~p’ are like arrows pointing in
opposite directions from the same point. (4.461)
Whereas the senses of “p” and “~p” are opposed to each-other, they share the same
meaning. This is easily brought out with the object-map from chapter I, this time with just
objects a, b, and c: 59
a

b

c

a
b
c

Let the proposition “ab” be indicated by “p”, “ac” by “q” and “bc” by “r”. Placing an “X”
in a box indicates that the state of affairs exists, “p” is true if there is an X in the ab box.
Otherwise it is false. Let us assume that “p” is true and “q” is false; the range left open to
the facts looks like this:
p&q&r

~p & ~q & r

p & ~q & ~r

~p & ~q & ~r

~p & q & r

p & ~q & r

~p & q & ~r

p & q & ~r

This map serves its purpose: there is still the possibility of “r” being either true or false, and
this is exactly what “p & ~q” should do. But if we move to the object map a problem crops

For simplicity I shade most of the boxes (ruling them out as possible combinations). There are only three
possible states of affairs in this world.
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up, and it corresponds exactly to the collapse of Wittgenstein’s paper analogy given for truth
in 4.063. 60

a
a

b

c

X

b
c

I did not mention whether “r” was true or false, but the object map displays it as false, just
as it does “q”. If the proposition “r” pictures ac, then there is no way to simply indicate it on
this map without indicating it as true or as false; a proposition can only picture a situation
(have a meaning) if it does so with a sense, with direction. It must say that the situation
either exists or does not exist.
This is Wittgenstein’s theory of truth and sense. What is important to see is that the
object map is a language under Wittgenstein’s theory. It is essential that I have set up some
correlation between the parts of the map and objects in our imagined world, and also that I
have given “rules of projection” for how the map is to determine reality. My rules were to
correlate “a” with a, etc., and stipulate that if “a” and “b” share a box in their respective
paths marked with an “X”, then the state of affairs ab exists, if they share a box not marked
with an “X” then ab does not exist. It is only in fixing which situation is pictured, how to
picture that situation as existing, and how to picture that situation as not existing, that one
gets a proposition.
Wittgenstein’s critique of Frege’s theory of truth appears exactly where the map
broke down on the previous page: I had stipulated that “q” was false and said nothing about
60

This collapse is not a critique of Wittgenstein; he mentions it himself to illustrate the point.
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“r”, but in the map both “q” and “r” were presented as false. Wittgenstein writes, “The verb
of a proposition is not ‘is true’ or ‘is false’, as Frege thought: rather, that which ‘is true’ must
already contain the verb.” (4.063) For Wittgenstein’s theory – as captured by the map – there
is no way to have a proposition without determining when it is true and when it is false
(there is either an “X” or there isn’t – there is no third possibility). In giving different
meanings to “p” and “~p” Frege leaves this undetermined, because there is no essential
connection between the two facts. There must be something common between the two
propositions, but in Frege’s account the only thing common is symbolic – both the thoughts
and meanings are distinct.
The question now is: how does this critique of Frege allow Wittgenstein to hold
theses (1’), (2’) and (4’)?
(1’) logic consists of propositions with no content,
(2’) logic gives necessary preconditions for truth,
(4’) logic is neither descriptive nor normative.
First, it follows from Wittgenstein’s notion of sense that “no picture can be true a priori.”
(2.225; 5.634) There is a single type of exceptional proposition:
3.04 If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility
ensured its truth.
3.05 A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth
were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with).
Tautologies are just such propositions, (4.461-4.462; 6.113; 6.127) and the propositions of
logic are tautologies. (6.1) They are the disintegration of combinations of signs (4.466), and
as such they are thoughts which guarantee their own truth. Logic consists of all and only
propositions which are not pictures – the propositions with no content. This stands in stark
contrast to Frege’s view, according to which the laws of logic describe a platonic realm.
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As regards thesis (2’), consider the fact that the object map can be thought of as a
language, just as Wittgenstein argues that a truth table can be a propositional sign. (4.442) The
map consists of facts, or parts which stand to one another in determinate ways.
Furthermore, we could set up a simple convention to make the “range-left-open-to-thefacts” map also serve as a language; we stipulate that “p” is short-hand for “ab”, “q” for “ac”
and “r” for “bc”. Then both maps have the form required to serve as a picture; “p” is true if
there is an “X” in the “ab” box. The situation described here is similar to the one described
in 4.014: “A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written, notes, the sound-waves, all
stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language
and the world.” All of the variant languages for describing the simple imagined world share
internal relations with one another, and they all share that same internal relation with the
imagined world itself. Logic gives the conditions for the possibility of truth by displaying
these internal and formal relations.
Frege’s holds that natural language is ambiguous; it is never quite clear which
thought is being expressed. In order to say something true one must express a thought
without ambiguity; to display such thoughts Frege constructs his Conceptual Notation. He
doesn’t construct it in order to explain natural language, which works fine for its own
purposes, but rather to give us a means of scientifically investigating the logic of these pure
thoughts. For Wittgenstein, the relationship between logic and language is different:
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense,
without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is – just as
people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.
Everyday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language
is.
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the
outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for
entirely different purposes.
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The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are
enormously complicated. (4.002)
Wittgenstein’s view is not that a more explicit logical notation (such as his truth-tables, or my
object map) is a “better picture” of the world; the only difference is that it is easier to gather
what its logical form is. (6.122) Everyday language must possess logical form, even if it is
“disguised.” If a proposition is a proposition, then it determines a place in logical space. Of
course we might not understand all of the conventions that determine this space, and thus
we might not fully understand the proposition. It is the task of philosophy to give a critique
of language in this sense (4.0031), to give a logical analysis of propositions, and thus make
clear the logical form that allows them to be propositions. Language is not ambiguous; we
have an ambiguous understanding of our language. The task of logical analysis is to help us
see the determinate clarity that was already in the proposition to begin with.
In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein explains this point using a metaphor of depth. “Words
are probes; some reach very deep; some only to a little depth,” (NB 39) and “(The older a
word, the deeper it reaches.)” (NB 40) As one of our complex words gets older and older it
becomes integrated into our everyday life in more and more ways.

In this way, the

conventions which govern its contribution to the senses of propositions become more and
more complex, to the point where in everyday language we don’t even know exactly what
the conventions are. Another striking Notebooks metaphor continues the theme: “words are
like the film on deep water.” (NB 52) The surface of our language is just fine for a surface;
the logic of our language lies hidden underneath it, supporting it and keeping it afloat.
The logician’s job is to create a perfect logical notation where the conventions are all
apparent; the philosopher’s job is to show, through analysis, how everyday language
connects with such a perfect notation, and thereby to demonstrate that philosophical
propositions are nonsensical, because they do not end up picturing states of affairs. (6.53)
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This leads to Wittgenstein’s transcendental theory of symbolism. To show how language is
actually able to work we need to give the logical form which makes it possible. A perfectly
perspicuous logical notation would do exactly that, and it is his intention in the Tractatus to
describe such a notation. (6.122) Such a notation would display logical form clearly, and
therefore display the logical preconditions necessary for the possibility of truth. The task,
one should see, is a Kantian one.
I have explained why Wittgenstein holds (1’) and (2’); logic is empty because it
consists of tautologies which stand in no picturing relation to the world, and it is
transcendental precisely because it gives the logical form which allows propositions to be
pictures.

From these two theses (4’) follows.

The first element of (4’) should be

immediately clear. If logic doesn’t describe anything, then it isn’t descriptive. But the
second element – the lack of any prescriptive force – is less clear. First we must understand
what is meant by “prescriptive.” 61
Recall Frege’s hybrid view of laws: they are both descriptive and prescriptive. Laws
are descriptive in that they give general truths about reality; they are prescriptive in that we
ought to think in accordance with them. That is, insofar as we are trying to think truths in
any particular domain, we ought to think thoughts which are consistent with the general laws
which describe that domain. It should be immediately clear why Wittgenstein doesn’t hold
this view: since logic isn’t descriptive, its descriptive content can’t be simultaneously
prescriptive. But while discussing this view of Frege’s, we saw that on the prescriptive side
of the hybrid view he was in agreement with Kant.

Thus my statement that the

Another position according to which logic is prescriptive is Russell’s: everyday language is ambiguous, and in
order to be clearer it ought to be more logical. The position outlined by Frege was similar, but one thing I’ve
tried to stress in this chapter is that Frege differs from Russell on this issue. Wittgenstein’s relation to this
position of Russell’s is the subject matter of chapter III section 1; at issue here is the sense in which Frege sees
logic as normative.
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transcendental status of logic prevents it from having any normative force might seem
confusing, since I’ve taken “transcendental” in Kant’s sense, but Kant sees logic as
normative.
We must remember that Kant’s distinction between general and transcendental logic
no longer holds good for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein agrees with Kant’s philosophy of pure
general logic, but as we saw in his theory of symbolism, he grafts the essence of Kant’s
transcendental philosophy onto general logic. That is, Wittgenstein holds both (1’) and (2’).
While Kant’s general logic is not transcendental, it is clear that his transcendental logic cannot
have any normative force. Kant sees his transcendental logic as giving the conditions
according to which we structure the world. Kant holds that without bringing the intuitions
given to us under categories we would have no coherent world at all, but only a series of
random unintelligible intuitions. (B 143) This is definitely not to say that we ought to bring
our judgments under the categories. Kant’s argument takes a transcendental form: (1) we do
have coherent experience, (2) in order to have coherent experience would have to structure
our intuitions according to the categories, therefore (3) we structure our intuitions according
to the categories. If we don’t bring our intuitions under the categories we simply don’t have
experience, and we certainly don’t have knowledge. We do so of necessity, not by choice.
The same is true of Wittgenstein’s theory of sense. We can not choose to give our pictures
logical form. If they don’t have logical form, then they aren’t pictures. Logical form gives
the conditions necessary for the possibility of a proposition; without them we don’t have an
illogical proposition, we just don’t have a proposition. (5.4733) In the next chapter the
implications of this point for both Wittgenstein’s philosophical and technical logic will be
addressed.
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III. Logic

“It is clear that whatever we can say in advance about the form of all propositions, we must be able to say all
at once.” (5.47)

1. Logic must take care of itself
The aphorism “Logic must take of itself” is the oldest surviving remark from
Wittgenstein’s notebooks, and occurs repeatedly throughout them (as well as at 5.473 in the
Tractatus). Of it, David Pears writes, “In other words, logic is a self-contained system which
can be validated only from within. Its formulae, therefore, must be completely different
from factual sentences, which have to measure up to something outside themselves.” (Pears
1987, 21) Stated in such generality, Pears’ words are correct, but he goes on to interpret “can
be validated only from within” as meaning little more than the banal point that a formal
system cannot prove its own axioms. 62 There is more to Wittgenstein’s point than this, but
it does approximate the issue which concerns him. He writes in the 1913 Notes on Logic,
“Deductions only proceed according to the laws of deduction but these laws cannot justify
the deduction.” (NL 93) And in the Tractatus: “clearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn
be subject to laws of logic.” (6.123) The question is not what justifies some particular logical
theorem – that was already explained via truth-tables – but rather what justifies logic as a
whole. Wittgenstein’s answer, as should be apparent from the previous chapter, comes in
logic’s relationship to language.

And as I will argue below, interpreting Wittgenstein along these lines is forbidden by the simple fact that he
does not conceive of logic as being an axiomatic formal system. (See 6.127)
62
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Russell misunderstood Wittgenstein’s answer, and his confusion proves illuminating.
In his introduction to the book (with which Wittgenstein was thoroughly dissatisfied), 63
Russell writes,
Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for accurate Symbolism, i.e. for
Symbolism in which a sentence ‘means’ something quite definite. In practice,
language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise.
Thus, logic has … to deal with … the conditions for sense rather than nonsense in
combinations of symbols… A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which
prevent nonsense… Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a
logically perfect language – not that any language is logically perfect, or that we
believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a logically perfect language,
but that the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfils this
function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language which we postulate.
(Russell 1921, x)
I quote at length not only because this passage is obviously wrong as an interpretation of
Wittgenstein, 64 but because it clearly presents the difference between Wittgenstein and
Russell.

For Russell, “the meanings of common words are vague, fluctuating and

ambiguous, like the shadow thrown by a flickering street-lamp on a windy night.” (Russell
1914, 128) Russell believes that with a clearly constructed logical system we can improve
language by making it more precise. 65 Russell subsequently reads this view into the Tractatus.
In contrast, for Wittgenstein we do not take care of language by offering logical
prescriptions. A prescription that one must follow of necessity isn’t a prescription at all.
(Imagine being told “you really ought to be numerically identical with yourself.”) The point
is made explicit in the Tractatus at 6.124: “logic is not a field in which we express what we
wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary
In letters to Russell he wrote, “There’s so much of [your introduction] that I’m not quite in agreement with –
both where you’re critical of me and also where you’re simply trying to elucidate my point of view” (WL 86)
and “You see, when I actually saw the German translation of the Introduction, I couldn’t bring myself to let it
be printed with my work. All the refinement of your English style was, obviously, lost in the translation and
what remained was superficiality and misunderstanding.” (WL 87-88)
64 5.5563 states, “In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical
order.” See also 4.002 and NB 69-71.
65 See PLA 37-38 for a statement of this view in relation to Russell’s atomistic analysis.
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signs speaks for itself.” 66 It is this transcendental aspect of logic – not its “ideal” status –
which justifies it. The first comment in the Tractatus on “logic must take care of itself” runs,
“Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only
because language itself prevents any logical mistake. What makes logic a priori is the
impossibility of illogical thought.” (5.4731)
The point follows from Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning.

Russell’s

interpretation requires that a sentence “accurately,” “precisely” or “unambiguously” picture a
possible situation. But we can only ask whether a proposition unambiguously pictures a
possible situation once we already know which situation is supposed to be pictured. What
could this “supposed picturing” relation consist in, if not actually being pictured? We can
only assess the logical form of a proposition if it does have that form. The same thing is
true of actual pictures; if a picture is drawn so chaotically that we have no idea what it is
supposed to picture then we can’t assess its accuracy. The question “is that an accurate
picture” only makes sense if it can be continued: “is that an accurate picture of …” But also,
the difference between Wittgenstein’s picture theory and pictures themselves is that the
subtle distinctions between a good and a bad drawing or painting are not present in
Wittgenstein’s view of language: a proposition either pictures a possible state of affairs or it
doesn’t, and that is the end of the matter.
When one abuses logic one doesn’t start speaking imprecisely; one ceases to speak.
Thus Wittgenstein writes, “Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition must
have a sense. And I say that any possible proposition is legitimately constructed…” (5.4733)

The clearest example of this point in the Tractatus is Wittgenstein’s treatement of identity. Whereas in
Russell’s symbolism one writes “f(a,b)a = b” to express identity, Wittgenstein writes, “f(a,a).” “Identity of
object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by
difference of sign.” (5.53) The point is that identity is reflected in the nature of the symbolism itself, instead of
being applied to an object by our symbolism.
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The distinction between signs, which are mere sounds or scratches on paper, and symbols,
which are such signs in their projective relation to the world, (3.32-3.323) is the crux of the
argument. A nonsensical string of signs, e.g. “counter apple loves,” is not an illegitimately
constructed proposition; it isn’t a proposition at all. It is a fact in the world that stands in no
pictorial relationship because it possesses no pictorial form, and therefore the “names”
“counter, apple, loves” do not connect to objects. They can only do so in an actual
proposition. (3.3) The butterfly’s feelers, so to speak, have not yet been laid down. Only by
actually possessing the right kind of logical form can a sentence be a proposition. The very
possibility of a normative logic is already ruled out by the picture theory of meaning.
Both Frege and Russell present their logical systems as following from a small
number of “basic laws” or “primitive propositions” – they present them as a system of
truths. Wittgenstein critiques this, 67 and argues that what their systems attempt to say is
shown through the dissolution of sense in tautology and contradiction. This idea was already
developed in 1914, 68 and received its full formulation in the Tractatus: “The propositions of
logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form
propositions that say nothing.” (6.121) And again,
If, for example, two propositions ‘p’ and ‘q’ in the combination ‘p → q’ yield a
tautology, then it is clear that q follows from p. For example, we see from the two
propositions themselves that ‘q’ follows from ‘(p → q) & p”, but it is also possible to
show it in this way: we combine them to form “[(p → q) & p] → q”, and then show
that this is a tautology. (6.1221) 69
See especially 6.127 (“it is not the case that some propositions of logic are essentially primitive propositions
and others essentially derived propositions…”) and 6.1271 (“It is clear that the number of ‘primitive
propositions of logic’ is arbitrary…”)
68 See Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway, 108-109, for a primitive version of the following passages from the
Tractatus. In 1913 Wittgenstein held that the propositions of logic are not tautologies, but generalizations of
tautologies (i.e. not “p v ~p” but rather “(p)p v ~p”). (See NL 94 and 104 for a statement of the position, and
NB 11-12 for the entries in which he first rejects it.) The simplest reason why Wittgenstein rejects this earlier
position is that he comes to reject the possibility of quantifying over propositions. Rather, given his new
analysis of generality (as explained in section 3), “p v ~p” itself shows what “(p)p v ~p” attempts to say.
69 See also 6.12-6.1201, 6.124, 6.126-6.1261, and 6.22. An interesting remark about the implications of
tautology and contradiction appears in the Notebooks: “The tautology shows what it appears to say, the
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While we might be able to immediately see the logical implications of some statements, some
logical propositions could need “discovering,” that is, they might be immensely complicated.
(6.1262) The method for discovering them would be to (1) conjoin and bracket the premises,
(2) make the result the antecedent of a conditional, (3) make the “conclusion” of the proof
the consequent of that conditional, and then (4) to show, via the truth-tables, that this
construction is a tautology. 70 It is in showing that the senses of the propositions dissolve in
such a combination that the structures of those propositions are made clear. But we aren’t
thereby deducing anything new; we are simply showing what was already displayed in the
propositions themselves – their logical structure.
Thus this “method of discovery” is advocated as such in the early 1913 “Notes on
Logic,” but in the Tractatus itself this idea is taken to show that “we can actually do without
logical propositions; for in a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the formal properties
of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions themselves.” (6.122) The TF
notation and the truth-tables 71 are both just such suitable notations, in that through writing
any proposition as a truth table we would be able to see clearly which other propositions are
contained in it, without having to actually combine them so as to form either a tautology or a
contradiction. “It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that
they are true from the symbol alone, and this fact contains in itself the whole of the philosophy of
logic.” (6.113, italics mine)

contradiction shows the opposite of what it appears to say.” (NB 12) For a formal elucidation of this point, see
6.1201.
70 I present this as a “process” or a “method” for proving a proposition to connect Wittgenstein’s position to
more standard accounts of proof, but for him this method is unnecessary; all that matters is simply displayed in
the final product: the truth table. “In logic process and result are equivalent.” (6.1261)
71 Both are a further development of the “ab” notation from “Notes on Logic,” which was Wittgenstein’s first
attempt at an adequate symbolism. See NL 95-96, 102, 106 and WL 33, 40-43. These passages also contain an
excellent discussion of the philosophical import of such a notation.
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There are two chief elements in Russell’s philosophy of logic: that we are acquainted
with logic and also that for language to be meaningful it must be logical. Russell keeps these
two issues separate: we are acquainted with logic through self-evidence and then we apply it
to language; we are thus left with the possibility (or as Russell believes: the actuality) that the
application won’t match the logic.

While Wittgenstein does hold that we have immediate

acquaintance with logic, i.e. it shows itself, we have it precisely because it is reflected in
language, not because it ought to be. Thus “it is clear that logic cannot clash with its
application.” (5.557) Granted, we still might actually have to do something, namely construct
a proper logical symbolism, but such a symbolism is not a replacement for natural language.
A proper logical symbolism is simply one in which we can see more clearly what was already
in a language. Wittgenstein expresses this wryly in the notebooks, writing after the third
occurrence of “logic must take care of itself:” “all we have to do is look and see how it does
it.” (NB 11)

2. Logical truths are analytic
What Wittgenstein means by this claim is prima facia quite clear; he writes at 6.1, “The
propositions of logic are tautologies,” and then at 6.11, “Therefore the propositions of logic
say nothing. (They are the analytic propositions.)”

That is, logic has no content (is

senseless), in the sense already explained. In this section I would like to discuss the import of
this view. As an elucidation, consider the debate between Russell and Wittgenstein regarding
logic’s generality. According to Russell (and Frege), the propositions of logic receive their
special status by being absolutely general, since they apply to anything. 72 The Principia states,

72 See Russell 1903, xii and xvii. In October of 1914 (NB 10-14) Wittgenstein still accepted Russellian complete
generality as a distinctly logical mark, and struggled to explain how such propositions could fail to attach to the
world (viz. be tautological). Eventually he gives up, deciding that “from all this, of course, it follows that there
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“The ideas and propositions of logic are all general: an assertion (for example) which is true of
Socrates but not of Plato, will not belong to logic, and if an assertion which is true of both is
to occur in logic, it must not be made concerning either, but concerning some variable x.”
(PM 93) In virtue of dealing with variables, propositions of logic make statements about all
things. Again in Theory of Knowledge:
The proposition ‘if Socrates is human, and whatever is human is mortal, then
Socrates is mortal’ might be thought, at first, to be a proposition of logic. But it is
obvious that its truth is in no way dependent on any peculiarity of Socrates or
humanity or mortality, but only on the form of the proposition; that is to say,
Socrates, humanity, and mortality may be varied as we please without the proposition
ceasing to be true. Thus we arrive at the pure logical proposition: “Whatever x and
Ψ and Φ may be, if x is Ψ and whatever is Ψ is Φ, then x is Φ.” (TN 98)
Wittgenstein found this unacceptable, because “to be general means no more than to be
accidentally valid for all things. An ungeneralized proposition can be tautological just as well
as a generalized one.” (6.1231) A logical proposition might, or it might not, be generalized.
This is unimportant. What matters is that there is no content to the proposition. 73
Wittgenstein’s suggestion that one could even do logic with contradictions (6.1202)
indicates just how radical his break from this idea is, and it brings out the real force of his
claim that logic is analytic. For if, as according to Frege and Russell, logic gives the most
general truths about reality, a claim that logic could be a series of false – indeed contradictory –
propositions would appear to be the ravings of a mad anti-logician.

But, because of

Wittgenstein’s purely logical definition of tautology, and demonstration that it exhibits the

are completely general propositions!” (NB 14) and develops the view of the Tractatus according to which completely
generalized propositions can provide a description of the entire world, instead of being logical propositions.
(5.526-5.5261)
73 Indeed, there can be no distinction between particular and general content in logic, since there is no content.
(5.454) But one might still say that for Russell the propositions of logic are general in that they apply to all
objects, whereas for Wittgenstein they are general in that they apply to none.
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same essential characteristic as contradiction (namely dissolution of sense), this blasphemy
becomes an almost obvious point.
There is another important aspect to the claim about contradiction at 6.1202 that has
eluded commentators. 74 For a proposition to have a sense it must be an expression of
bipolarity: capable of both truth and falsehood. In lacking just this characteristic tautology
and contradiction become senseless. But, nonetheless, the symmetry of truth and falsehood is
reflected in the contrast between tautology and contradiction itself. Wittgenstein wrote of
4.464 to C.K. Ogden, “Here I have put ‘tautology’ and ‘contradiction’ in the SINGULAR
and ‘propositions’ in the plural deliberately because there are in fact no contradictions but
there is only contradiction, for they all mean the same thing, i.e. nothing. And the same
applies to tautology.” (Wittgenstein 1973, 30; cf. 5.43 and 6.11)75 Thus bipolarity is not
reflected in individual contradictions or tautologies, but in the fact that logic could consist of
either tautology or contradiction. It is for this reason that logic is senseless and not nonsensical.
The dissolution of sense in logic is therefore a collapse of truth into falsity, and vice-versa.
But this is an empty collapse, since nothing is said to either be or not be the case. By each
being nothing, truth and falsity in logic are essentially the same thing. We saw already that ‘p’
and ‘~p’ have the same meaning but opposite sense. The same is true of ‘p v ~p’ and ‘~(p v
~p)’. The important distinction between the p/~p case and the tautology/contradiction
case is that the “same meaning” shared by tautology and contradiction is nothing. If sense is
the presentation of a meaning with direction (positively or negatively), and there is no meaning,

74 Indeed, this passage itself has eluded comment at all. Max Black, for example, in his “passage-by-passage”
commentary on the Tractatus, simply repeats the remark without saying anything about it. (Black 1964, 321)
75 This distinction between singular and plural is absent in the Pears and McGuinness translation.
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then there can be no presentation of it. 76 This is what the senselessness of logic consists of:
tautology and contradiction are “directionless.”
Wittgenstein’s earliest surviving logical remarks (a letter to Russell from June of
1912) state that “Logic must turn out to be of a TOTALLY different kind than any other
science.” (WL 10) The same idea is expressed at 6.112: “The correct explanation of the
propositions of logic must assign to them a unique status among all propositions.” Claims
about the a priori status of logic appear throughout the Notebooks and the Tractatus, but most
important is that, since they are not pictures of anything in the world, no experience of
anything in the world could justify their truth: “a priori knowledge that a thought was true
would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without
anything to compare it with).” (3.05) The purpose of Wittgenstein’s logical symbolism is to
show that logical propositions have precisely this characteristic. Logical propositions say
nothing at all. They are analytic.

3. Logic is simple
A simple glance at either the Basic Laws or the Principia immediately reveals
Wittgenstein’s target with this point. Both works give primitive (and “independent”) ideas
and propositions, i.e. axioms on which logic is to rest. In Russell, all of these are further
divided in accordance with the theory of types, such that virtually everything logical – even
truth and falsity – has a separate definition corresponding to each type. (PM 42, 46-47) 77

76 The problem corresponds to Frege’s infamous claim that empty referring expressions have a sense. (SM 3233) Evans gives an extended criticism of this position of Frege’s. (1982, 10-33)
77 Wittgenstein explicitly criticizes this at 5.451: “For example, once negation has been introduced, we must
understand it both in propositions of the form ‘~p’ and in propositions like ‘~(p v q)’, ‘(∃x)~fx,’ etc. We must
not introduce it first for the one class of cases and then for the other, since it would then be left in doubt
whether its meaning were the same in both cases, and no reason would have been given for combining the
signs in the same way in both cases.” (Cf. 5.46 and NB 21) This shows also that Wittgenstein’s objection to
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Some variation of this conception of logic – as resting on a number of primitive ideas – is
the core of almost all formal systems of logic, both before and after Wittgenstein.
Nonetheless, he calls it into question. Consider the following series of remarks:
5.453 All numbers in logic stand in need of justification.
Or rather, it must become evident that there are no numbers in logic.
There are no pre-eminent [ausgezeichneten] numbers.
5.454 In logic there is no co-ordinate status, and there can be no classification.
In logic there can be not distinction between the general and the specific.
5.4541 The solutions of the problem of logic must be simple, since they set the
standard of simplicity.
Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers
to question are symmetrically combine – a priori – to form a self contained system.
A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri. 78
Logic cannot significantly be divided into parts – “there are no numbers in logic.” (5.453)
Wittgenstein wrote to C.K. Ogden (as it appears at 4.128) regarding this remark:
What I meant was that in Logic there are no numbers which are in any sense more
important or of any greater significance, in any sense preeminent, as compared with
the rest of numbers. Such for instance many people believe that the number one is
such a number or the number 3. And if – for instance – there was in Logic a definite
number of primitive propositions or of primitive ideas – say the number one or any
other – then this number would have, in some sense, to prevail all through logic and
consequently also throughout philosophy. It would then be a number more
important than the rest, an “ausgezeichnete Zahl.” [pre-eminent number]
(Wittgenstein 1973, 29)
Thus we see that the division into, on the one hand, a number of general primitive
propositions, ideas, and axioms, and on the other, the theorems that follow from them, is
misguided. 79 All the propositions of logic – regardless of where they occur in the process of

the theory of types is neither a “digression,” nor based solely on the criticism regarding the mention of
meanings, as Black holds, but is central to and follows from his whole philosophy of logic.
78 See also NB 40 and 83.
79 Another criticism of this idea comes at 6.1271: “It is clear that the number of ‘primitive propositions of logic’
is arbitrary, since one could derive logic from a single proposition, e.g. by simply constructing the logical
product of Frege’s primitive propositions.” This arbitrariness is further compounded by the disparity between
different author’s, even between different works of the same author. In the Principles, for example, Russell
states that “all mathematics can be strictly and formally deduced from, and all the entities that occur in
mathematics can be defined in terms of … twenty premises.” (Russell 1903, 4)
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derivation – say nothing: “Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.”
(6.13) While it certainly is possible to write such a book on logic, one is only able to use “such
peculiar crotchets and contrivances” because “they are all connected with one another in an
infinitely fine network: the great mirror.” (5.511) Once the idea that logic expresses general
truths has been abandoned, the point immediately follows. Logic is ultimately simple, and
because of its emptiness, it is all contained systematically within itself.
The most concrete manifestation of this view comes in Wittgenstein’s “fundamental
idea,” that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; there can be no representatives of
the logic of facts” (4.0312) 80 The point appears already in Wittgenstein’s first logical letter to
Russell, (“there are NO logical constants”) (WL 10), and is one of the few ideas held
consistently in all sources from 1912 to 1921. Through his theory of acquaintance, Russell
argues that to be acquainted with any proposition we must be acquainted with its logical
form, and therefore with the objects which correspond to “particulars,” “universals, “or,”
“not,” etc… (TN 99) Even if the view that these are “entities” is given up (Loc. Cit.), we are
left with logical constants. These would be the ‘primitive ideas” of the Principia, through
which everything else is defined. But in laying bare the truth-possibilities of propositions via
the truth-tables, Wittgenstein eliminates this intuitive pull. The truth-table itself can be
understood as a propositional sign (a sentence), (4.442) and once the logical constants (“&”,
“v”, “→”, etc…) are eliminated from the propositional sign, the desire to postulate an object
for them to correspond to is on par with postulating objects for the horizontal and vertical
lines of the truth-table. (4.441)

McGuinness (1974) and Baker (1988, 37-41 and 102-103) both give excellent discussions of this point,
explaining it against Russell’s and Frege’s philosophies, respectively. Ricketts (2002) addresses both. The
virtue of all three of these articles is that they take seriously the claim that this is the Grundgedanke of the
Tractatus.
80
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Wittgenstein not only eliminates the motivation for positing logical objects; he also
supplies an argument for why one can’t view logical constants as objects: “if there were an
object called ‘~’, it would follow that ‘~~p’ said something different from what ‘p’ said, just
because the one proposition would then be about ~ and the other would not.” (5.44)
Likewise with any of Russell’s logical constants: 81 because of the inter-definability of the
various constants, it would appear that two completely synonymous statements (i.e. “p → q”
and “~p v q”) would be about different things. We are led to the simplicity of logic: there
really isn’t any difference between “p → q” and “~p v q.” The truth-tables show this; it is
because there is no difference between the two that there can not be logical objects.
Thus, in addition to rejecting the objects that are to correspond to the logical
constants, he rejects the logical constants themselves, insofar as they are taken to be a
multiplicity of “indefinables.” Wittgenstein writes, “The interdefinability of Frege’s and
Russell’s ‘primitive signs’ of logic is enough to show that they are not primitive signs… And
it is obvious that the ‘→’ defined by means of ‘~’ and ‘v’ is identical with the one that figures
with ‘~’ in the definition of ‘v’; and that the second ‘v’ is identical with the first one; and so
on.” (5.42) The point is that selecting two constants as primitive does not change anything
about them – they remain the same constants as when one makes a different selection. And
the point remains as we move from propositional to predicate logic: “This vanishing of the
apparent logical constants also occurs in the case of ‘~(∃x).~fx’, which says the same as
(x).fx’, and in the case of ‘(∃x).fx.x = a’, which says the same as ‘fa’.” (5.441) There is not a
unique set of logical constants from which all others are to be derived.
What, then, are logicians to use instead? If “p v q” isn’t about “p,” “q,” and the
logical constant “or,” what is the meaning of a molecular proposition? This is precisely the
81

The same criticism applies to Frege.
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question Wittgenstein asked himself in June of 1912 following his having informed Russell
that “there are NO logical constants.” 82 After considering various proposals, he found the
germ of his final solution: “I believe that our problems can be traced down to the atomic
propositions.” (WL 16) 83 This should strike one as paradoxical, since atomic propositions
are simply defined as those which contain no logical connectives. How, then, could a correct
analysis of atomic propositions make the nature of logical connectives clear?
This problem is central for Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic. For it has all revolved
around the idea that logic is empty, but if logical symbols have no referents what is it that
they contribute to a proposition? Wittgenstein answers this question with the general
propositional form.

4. The general form of a proposition
The central importance of the general form is reflected clearly in the numbering of
the Tractatus. The book consists of seven remarks, with everything else being a comment on
those remarks. It begins with a characterization of the world (1) and that out of which the
world is constituted: facts (2). We then move to isomorphic representation of facts in thoughts
(3), which are subsequently identified with propositions (4). The truth-functional nature of a
proposition is then given (5). Thus as we arrive at the general logical form of a truthfunction (6), we are given a characterization of the essence of both representation and the
world. When Wittgenstein wrote in the Notebooks that his whole task consists in explaining
the nature of the proposition, he continues with, “in giving the nature of all being.” (NB 39)

82 He was tormented, writing in August, “Now as to ‘p v q’ etc.: I have thought that possibility – namely that all
our troubles could be overcome by assuming different sorts of Relations of signs to things – over and over and
over again! For the last 8 weeks!!! But I have come to the conclusion that this assumption does not help us a
bit.” (WL 15)
83 See also NB 28-29, 36-40, 45, 71, 76, and 89-90.
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In the Tractatus: “To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all
description, and thus the essence of the world.” (5.4711)
Given all the previous considerations, what Wittgenstein needs is a logical construction
which will, (1) be transcendental, that is, support natural language, not correct it (2) be
obtained wholly a priori and contain the necessary form of all propositions, (3) contain within
itself the “peculiar crotchets and contrivances” of logic (primitive propositions, axioms,
inference rules), and (4) show that the meanings of all the “logical constants” are contained
in elementary propositions, which (paradoxically) don’t even contain logical connectives.
The general propositional form is formulated twice in the Tractatus; once in the
vernacular and once in logical symbolism. The first presentation is as follows:
It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give a
description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that
every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and
every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the
meanings of the names are suitably chosen.
It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be
included in its description – for otherwise it would not be the most general form.
The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot
be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The
general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand. (4.5) 84
Any proposition, irrespective of whether it is a thought, an English, Chinese, or German
sentence, or an arrangement of tables and chairs, in order to be a proposition, must possess a
sense. It must be capable of both truth and falsehood. Wittgenstein declares that “a
proposition shows its sense” (4.022) and writing a proposition as a truth-table makes this
abundantly clear. In order to be capable of both truth and falsehood, a proposition must
represent a state of affairs that either exists or does not exist. It must state how things stand,

84

See NB 71, 89
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only in doing so does it become a proposition at all. Thus “This is how things stand” gives
that which is essential to all propositions.
The picture theory of meaning might be seen as the philosophical foundation for the
logic of the Tractatus. On Wittgenstein’s view this would be a mistake. It is equivalent with
the logic. As we saw, according to the picture theory of meaning, a picture has a sense, that
is, it pictures a situation in logical space in virtue of having both a true and a false pole.
According to remark (5), all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions,
which is to say that a proposition obtains its bipolarity in virtue of being a function on the
truth and falsity of propositions – again, this is made clear in the truth-tables as propositional
signs. “The sense of a truth-function of p is a function of the sense of p.” (5.2341) When
we connect elementary propositions using the propositional connectives we do not get a new
type of function; we simply rearrange the senses of the elementary propositions.

A

proposition is a picture oly in virtue of being such a function. What the logical formulation
gives is the form of all possible truth-functions, through which propositions are pictures. It
shows in a logical symbolism the form that all pictures must possess in order to correspond
to a state of affairs.
To understand Wittgenstein’s logical formulation of the general propositional form
we need to understand three things. The first is Dr. Scheffer’s famed Sheffer-stroke, expressed
as “p│q”. The Scheffer-stroke can mean either “neither p nor q” or “either not p or q”
(both are equivalent in power). Russell explains clearly in his introduction how all truthfunctions follow from the Sheffer-stroke: “‘Not-p and not-p’ is equivalent to ‘not-p’, hence
we obtain a definition of negation in terms of our primitive function: hence we can define ‘p
or q’, since this is the negation of ‘not-p and not-q’, i.e. of our primitive function.” (Russell
1922, xvi). Once we have negation and disjunction, both Frege and Russell had shown
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clearly how to obtain implication and conjunction. 85 Wittgenstein’s “operation N” is similar
to the Scheffer-stroke, but not identical to it (as is sometimes supposed); it makes use of the
sheffer-stroke.
Next is Wittgenstein’s notion of an expression. An expression is “any part of a
proposition that characterizes its sense,” (3.31) and is presented as the sole constant in what
Wittgenstein calls a “propositional variable.” (3.312) He writes, “Thus an expression is
presented by means of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the
expression… I call such a variable a ‘propositional variable.’” (3.313) For example, from
“Fa” we can obtain three propositional variables: by turning “a” into a variable we isolate the
“F” as expression, and “Fx” becomes a propositional variable with “Fa,” “Fb,” etc. as
values; turning “F” into a variable gives us “Φa” (values “Fa,” “Ga,” etc.); and finally, if we
turn both “F” and “a” into a variable we get “Φx.” 86 The third variable is a logical prototype;
it is no longer “dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the proposition.”
(3.315) We would have obtained other prototypes had we begun with “aRb” or “(x)Fx.”
And finally we must grasp Wittgenstein’s notation. He writes: “Every truth-function
is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation ‘(-----T)(ζ,
…..).’ This operation negates all the propositions in the right-hand pair of brackets, and I
call it the negation of those propositions.” (5.5) The first bracket contains the final line on a
truth-table; the second bracket contains an arbitrary selection of propositions. The truthfunction that results from this operation is true just in case all of the propositions listed on
the right are false, viz. only the last line on the truth table yields a T. To simplify, he writes
In the introduction to the second edition of the Principia Russell carries this through in detail. (For example,
“p → q” can be written “p|(q|q)”) See PM xvi-xix.
86 Note that we don’t have to aimlessly choose what to take as values for a propositional variable; these values
are determined by the form of the variable. Wittgenstein argues at 3.316-3.317 that we stipulate the values of the
variable, but we do so by “giving a description of the [values].” This is achieved through the present process of
abstraction: the form of the variable determines its values.
85

82
“N(¯ζ).” 87 “N” stands for the operation that yields a true proposition just in case all its bases
are false, and the bar before (or over the top of) “ζ” indicates that the variable is
representative of all of the propositions in the right-hand brackets. “What the values of the
variable are is something that is stipulated,” (5.501) and so if we stipulate that the value is just
“P,” then we simply have negation, if we stipulate that the values are “P” and “Q,” we have
the sheffer-stroke. As Soames explains “N”, “it is like the [Scheffer-stroke] in expressing
joint denial; it is a generalization of it in being able to operate not just on pairs of
propositions, but on arbitrarily large collections of them.” (Soames 1983, 574)
Now that we have a single operation in terms of which all others can be defined, we
can express the general form of a proposition: [¯p, ¯ζ, N(¯ζ)]. (6) “What this says is just that
every proposition is a result of successive applications to the elementary propositions of the
operation ‘N(¯ζ)’.” (6.001) 88 “¯p” stands for the totality of all elementary propositons, “¯ζ”
stands for any arbitrary selection of propositions (either elementary propositions or
propositions that have already resulted from applications of this operation), and “N(¯ζ)” is
the operation from above with the selection “¯ζ” as its base.
As an illustration, imagine a world with three elementary propositions: “Φa,” “Φb,”
and “Φc.” These three would then constitute all the values of “¯p.” “¯ζ” stands for any
selection of those values, so let us take “Φa:” we obtain negation (“~Φa”). Let us do the
same to “Φb,” and then select these two negated propositions as bases, giving us
conjunction (“Φa & Φb”). From here we could easily derive disjunction and implication. If
we select all three elementary propositions we get “(x)~(Φx)” or “~(∃x)(Φx).” Another
application gives us “(∃x)(Φx).”

87
88

Finally, if we begin by negating each proposition

My symbol deviates slightly from Wittgenstein’s. The “¯” occurs over the top of “ζ” in the Tractatus.
Russell’s explanation in the Introduction (xvi-xvii) is very clear.
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individually, and then select those three negative propositions as values we obtain, via
double-negation: “(x)(Φx).” We thus obtain both universal and existential quantification.
What is especially peculiar to the Tractatus is this attempt to derive generalized
propositions – those containing quantification – using a single operation, thus breaking
radically from both Frege and Russell (and subsequent logicians).

Both of them saw

quantification as essentially different from propositional connectives. Wittgenstein’s account
of generality is as follows: “If ζ has as its values all the values of a function fx for all values
of x, then N(¯ζ) = ~(∃x)fx.” (5.52) This has proved incredibly controversial, 89 but the
criticisms of this idea typically ignore the fact that an expression can be “presented by means
of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the expression.” (3.313; emphasis
mine) It is asked, how do we know that we have all of the propositions of a given form? 90
If we have a finite number of such propositions Wittgenstein’s claim is unproblematic; but
how are we to stipulate that it applies to the whole infinite number of propositions with a
given form? We need some means of stipulating the infinite number of propositions. But
this is exactly what a prototype does: it stands for all forms of a given type by being an
expression of their form. Thus we can append the “N” operator to a prototype and obtain
quantification over infinite domains. 91
It is important to see that the remarks about generality are surrounded by a
discussion of logical form and logical space. As was already explained in chapter I, each
proposition “reverberates through the whole of logical space,” and Wittgenstein restates this
principle immediately following the account of generality: “If objects are given, then at the
See Fogelin (1995), 78-83 for a criticism of Wittgenstein. Geach (1981, 1982) and Soames (1983) both give
solid responses to Fogelin.
90 Russell already made this criticism in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918, 42), and Anscombe expressed
the same concern. (1971, 148)
91 See Soames (1983) 574-575 and 582-586 for a technical account of how to express nested quantifiers with
this operation.
89
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same time we are given all objects. If elementary propositions are given, then at the same
time all elementary propositions are given.” (5.524) 92 Each proposition marks a location in
logical space, and “the whole of logical space must already be given by it.” (3.42) As Black
explains this passage, “if the ‘whole of logical space’ were not already ‘given’ by the
significance of a propositional sign, p, this would mean that the sense of p failed to
determine the relation of p to some truth-function of which it is a component.” (Black 1964,
157) The justification for how a propositional variable is able to present all propositions of a
particular form is thus transcendental: only its possibility guarantees that propositions are
situated in logical space. Their forms are all in a systematic relation to one another in order
that they may be combined with one another; what a propositional variable does is present
those forms.
We can finally return to the problem which plagued us at the conclusion of the
previous section: how is an account of atomic propositions supposed to explain the meaning
of the logical connectives? Wittgenstein’s answer is that, just as “p → q” can also be written
“~p v q,”
An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself. For ‘fa’ says
the same thing as ‘∃x(fx.x=a).’ For wherever there is compositeness, argument and
function are present, and where these are present, we already have all the logical
constants.” (5.47)
The logical constants are, in a word, nothing. No matter what logical devices we introduce,
they can all be captured by successive applications of the operation “N” to elementary
propositions; there is nothing more to any of the logical connectives. They introduce
nothing essentially new to propositions – even logical generality (quantification) is the result
of successive applications of “N”. Molecular assertions do nothing more than assert various
See also NB 76: “For if the elementary propositions are given, that gives us all elementary propositions, too,
and that gives us the general proposition.” (emphasis mine)
92
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combinations of elementary propositions; variation in the logical constants spurs variation in
the elementary propositions that are asserted, but that is all. We can summarize by thinking
back to the maps for the “range left open to the facts.” All propositions can do is rearrange
those boxes, filling some in with black and leaving others white. Adding more logical
connectives simply turns some boxes and some others off, so to speak. No amount of
logical complexity introduces new possibilities; the totality of states of affairs remains the
same.
Finding out exactly what elementary propositions there are is a matter of the
application of logic, not a matter of logic itself. (5.557) This is the notion of analysis, but
exactly what a Wittgensteinian analysis of the actual world would look like is hard to imagine,
especially given that the correct analysis of propositions might yield infinite elementary
propositions. (4.2211) 93 At least it would involve showing that an elementary proposition,
which might come expressed as a function (“Φa”), could also be written as a simple
concatenation of names, which correspond directly to the objects. Such a proposition is
completely analyzed. (3.2-3.201) 94
The argument in the Tractatus is not that by carrying through such an analysis we
would learn the truth of Wittgenstein’s logic. Rather, his logic hopes to establish that such
an analysis must be possible, because only if all propositions are truth functions of the senses
of elementary proposition could we explain how any of our everyday propositions have

Anscombe correctly stresses this point. (Anscombe 1971, 99) Cf. also 4.002: “Man possesses the ability to
construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or
what its meaning is.” In fact, this view follows from Wittgenstein’s same grounds for rejecting Russell’s axiom
of infinity – for a determination that there must be a finite number of elementary propositions would entail that
there are a finite number of objects, and how many objects there are can be of no consequence for logic.
94 Anscombe explains how a concatenation of names, say “abcd” is also a function. We can turn any of the
expressions into propositional variables, (i.e. “axcd”), and thereby produce a function.
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meaning. 95 Wittgenstein has explained how “words are like the film on deep water,” (NB
52) being supported, like lily pads, on an immensely complex logical structure.

But

nonetheless, we need only know that something is supporting them – not exactly what.
Gordon Baker develops this point in detail, concluding,
In advance of identifying simple objects and of ascertaining the composition of
elementary propositions certain crucial insights are claimed to be established: the
existence of simple objects, the independence of atomic propositions and the
equivalence of any proposition with a truth-function of elementary propositions.
Such philosophical propositions are, as it were, a priori. They are known in advance
of any detailed philosophical analysis of language. But investigation of the
application of logic will yield not contingent truths, but further a priori propositions.
By implication, the Tractatus enshrines the view that the grammar of a language can
be split up into two layers, one more fundamental than the other. (Baker 1988, 110)
We can see why one of Wittgenstein’s later criticisms of his early thought is
particularly striking: “don’t think, but look!” (PI § 66) For, in the strictest sense, the Tractatus
thinks, and leaves open the possibility that everything is hidden. What is ultimately rejected in
Wittgenstein’s later writings on language is the entire logical scaffolding of the Tractatus, in
that language is not seen as significant via its logical underpinnings but rather because of its
interaction with daily life. Frege saw the surface of language as hopelessly problematic for
scientific purposes; his Conceptual Notation is meant as a scientific replacement for natural
language. Russell held this position, too, but he showed through the theory of descriptions,
as Wittgenstein put it, that “the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real
one.” (4.0031) Wittgenstein adopts this consequence of the theory of descriptions, but he
abandons the Fregean element still present in Russell’s view: for Wittgenstein everyday
speech is in perfect logical order, it just isn’t clear what that order is. His logic is not meant
to replace language, but to explain how language actually works.

As Gordon Baker puts it, “Everything depends on the possibility of a complete analysis, but nothing depends
on having completed any analysis!” (Baker 1988, 86)
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Ultimately we are left with a nonsensical explanation of how senseless proposition
underlie propositions with sense. The propositions of logic explain everyday speech by
displaying their logical form in a systematic way (NDM 108), and they are therefore senseless,
but statements about logical propositions (i.e. the statements of the Tractatus) are nonsensical.
A proposition is a fact, and a fact is a combination of things. From this it follows that a
proposition can’t be a constituent of a proposition. It can, of course, be the base of a logical
operation that yields a new truth-function, but it is clear that “possesses a sense,” “is a fact,”
etc. are not logical operations. While we have seen that a massive number of disparate issues
and problems receive, “on all essential points, the final solution,” (Preface), we have yet to
explain “how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” This will be the concern of
the final chapter.
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IV. A Limited Whole
Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only
hold a teacup full of water even if were to pour out a gallon over it. (LE 40)
1. Ethical and logical necessity
A point often made in ethics is that “ought” implies “can.” It is characteristic of
Wittgenstein (both early and late) to stress that one can only say that something is true if it is
possibly false. From this it follows that “ought” must also imply “can’t,” for without
“can’t,” “can” makes no sense. The point here is simple: it is absurd to give someone an
imperative to do something that they can’t not do. We saw this already with logic: in giving
necessary conditions, logic is prohibited from telling us how language, or the world, ought to
be.
Wittgenstein writes in the Notebooks, “Ethics must be a condition of the world, like
logic.” (NB 77) A slightly less direct statement of the position is given at 6.43: “If the good
or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not
the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language.” Just as the propositions of
logic are the limiting propositions (and in limiting language they also limit the world), a good
or bad will limits the world. This follows also from my interpretation of a “condition of the
world” as being a transcendental condition.

Wittgenstein writes at 6.13, “Logic is

transcendental” and then at 6.421, “Ethics is transcendental.” This is not to say that logic
and ethics are the same thing, but they are structurally similar. 96
In chapter II I grappled with the problem of how logic could be neither descriptive
nor prescriptive. Here the same paradox arises, but with even more force: how could ethics

96

See Diamond’s brief discussion of this relationship in Diamond 2000, 168.
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fail to be normative?

Immediately following the “Ethics is transcendental” remark,

Wittgenstein writes,
When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt…’, is laid down, one’s first thought is,
‘And what if I do not do it?’ It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with
punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about the
consequences of an action must be unimportant. – At least those consequences should
not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed.
There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they
must reside in the action itself. (6.422)
Since ethics is transcendental, it should be impossible respond to an ethical imperative with
“and what if I do not do it?” But we can do this. One might be tempted to take this as a
refutation of the view that ethics is transcendental, but Wittgenstein immediately dismisses
this temptation by pointing out that the question is confused. The imperative to do (or not
to do) any action must be independent of its consequences.

Just as the logic of a

proposition must reside in the proposition itself (not in something else to which it refers),
the ethics of an action must reside in the action itself. At this point it still seems as if ethics
is ushering in prescriptions. In this passage he doesn’t reject all laws of the form “Thou
shalt…”, but only those in which the imperative is based on consequences.
Wittgenstein’s 1929 “Lecture on Ethics” clears things up. In the beginning of the
lecture Wittgenstein goes on as if ethics is normative; he says that ethics might be thought of
as “the right way of living” (LE 38), and then he draws a distinction between relative and
absolute value. Relative value is simply value according to a predetermined purpose, i.e. a
chair is good if it is comfortable and sturdy. A relative imperative is one according to a
predetermined goal, i.e. one ought to exercise if one wants to be healthy. If someone tells
me I ought to exercise, and I tell them I simply don’t care about my health, then there is little
more that he can say. Then Wittgenstein says,
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Suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said
‘You’re behaving like a beast’ and then I were to say ‘I know I behave badly, but then
I don’t want to behave any better,’ could he then say ‘Ah, then that’s all right’?
Certainly not; he would say ‘Well, you ought to want to behave better.’ Here you have
an absolute judgment of value. (LE 39)
While all statements of relative value can be analyzed as statements of fact, he argues that
there can be no proposition which makes an absolute value judgment. He gives another
example, which brings us back to the connection to logic and necessity:
The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is
quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from
such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the
expression ‘the absolutely right road.’ I think it would be the road which everybody on
seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And
similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which
everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or
feel guilty for not bringing about. (LE 40)
The message here is clear, and it is also clear how it connects with the remark about “Thou
shalt ...” laws at 6.422. When an ethicist tells one that they ought to do something, this
“something” is a state of affairs which the agent ought to bring about. Even on a nonconsequentialist ethical view, the imperative is still to bring about a state of affairs.
Wittgenstein rejects this. 97 He writes, “If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the
world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what is expressed by
means of language.” (6.43) If ethics is to have anything to do with the world it must do so in
virtue of limiting the world, just as logic does.
There are obviously differences between logic and ethics. Logical proposition have
the unique status of being senseless, not nonsensical. It is precisely the fact that logic can be
displayed in the dissolution of the proposition – tautology and contradiction – that shows its
97 See also the discussion with the Vienna Circle from December 17th, 1930: “A “should” therefore only has
sense when something enforces it – a power which rewards and punishes. A “should” in itself is nonsense.”
(Wittgenstein 1984b, 118; translation mine)
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world-limiting nature. The same is not true of ethical propositions; a remark about the
meaning of life is nonsensical, and as such it does nothing to display the structure of
language or the world. To understand the sense in which ethics serves as a limit of the world
we must understand the connection between the self and the will.
The structural location in the Tractatus of the passages which address the self seems
jarring. Occurring at 5.6, they are sandwiched between remarks on 5.5 (“Every truthfunction is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation (----T)(ζ, …..)…”) and 6 (“The general form of a truth-function is [¯p, ¯ζ, N(¯ζ)] …”). 98 This
obviously indicates a strong connection between the self and logic, for it is precisely in these
surrounding logical remarks that Wittgenstein draws the logical limits of language. 5.6, the
proposition on which all the remarks about the self are comments, is: “The limits of my language
mean the limits of my world.” Further reinforcing the connection to logic, the first
comment (before passing to solipsism and the self), begins: “Logic pervades the world: the
limits of the world are also its limits.” (5.61)
Let us look closer at the solipsistic limits. He continues,
5.62 For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes
itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
5.621 The world and life are one.
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)
In this progression Wittgenstein appears to be nothing more than a strait-forward solipsist,
with the caveat that one cannot say that one is a solipsist. But as Fogelin has argued, 99 it isn’t

Their structural location in the Prototractatus makes the logical connections even clearer; 5.6 does not even
occur as a first-level comment, it is at *5.335, with *5.33 being a remark about identity. (5.53 in the Tractatus).
99 See Fogelin 1995, 93-95. Fogelin ultimately concludes that Wittgenstein has no argument, and that
Wittgenstein uses the doctrine of showing as “a perfect insulation for a deeply held belief.” (95) As with most
of Fogelin’s work on the Tractatus, this chapter is a useful model of how not to read Wittgenstein. I will argue
this presently.
98
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immediately clear what is motivating the view. These passages refer back to 5.6 (“The limits
of my language mean the limits of the world”): whence the sudden appearance of “my”?
Before 5.6 there is no mention of an individual at all. Both language and the world have
been considered more or less asocially, 100 but there has been no mention of privacy either.
Consider two more passages:
5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on
my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which
were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that
in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that
book.⎯
5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without
extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it.
These passages seem more like a critique of solipsism, and we are told simply that “there is
no such thing as the subject.”
The position we’re in is this. Wittgenstein has denied that there is any metaphysical
subject: there is no “self” whose life the world could be. But he nonetheless says “what the
solipsist means is quite correct” and “the world and life are one.” The synthesis of these
contrasting views comes in the limiting nature of the self:
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world.’
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of
the world – not a part of it.

The most notable exception is 4.002 and the role of “rules of projection” in the picture theory (3.12-3.13).
While it isn’t directly stated, it is at least consistent with the Tractatus view to see these rules as established by
“enormously complicated” social conventions.
100
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There is no thing called the “subject” whose life the world is. Rather, there is simply the
world. But nonetheless it is my world. 101 “The world is given me, i.e. my will enters into the
world completely from outside as into something that is already there.” (NB 74) We can
think back to the book “The world as I found it.” Wittgenstein writes, “I want to report
how I found the world… I have to judge the world, to measure things.” (NB 82) But
whereas the world is given to me, and I have to judge it, the I is not presented to me. It is
exactly like our visual field: we do not see the eye, we see with the eye. (5.633)
If the metaphysical subject isn’t a self that thinks or entertains ideas, what is it?
Wittgenstein explains with a division into two senses of the self: “the thinking subject is
surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.” (NB 80) Wittgenstein rejects the
traditional solipsistic viewpoint, according to which the world is nothing but a collection of
my subjective ideas. 102 But we still confront the world, and there is nothing in the world that
could account for this. Instead of a thinking subject which confronts ideas, Wittgenstein
affirms a willing subject which confronts the world. I can will a fact; I can want a fact to be
the case. But “the world is independent of my will.” (6.373) There is no logical connection
between the world and the will – whatever we will either can or cannot be the case whether
we will it or not. (6.374) It is in this connection that the motivation for solipsism is to be
found.
Interpretations of Wittgenstein’s “solipsism” turn on the parenthetical remark in
5.62: “The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.” There are two ways of

The strongest statement of this position in the Notebooks is quite clear: “What has history to do with me?
Mine is the first and only world!” (NB 82)
102 He briefly considers it in the Notebooks, writing, “As my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the worldwill.” (NB 85; emphasis mine) But he continues three days later: It is true that the knowing subject is not in the
world, that there is no knowing subject.” (NB 86)
101
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reading (and translating) the original German (“der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe”): 103 “that
language which alone I understand” (Pears and McGuinness) or “the [only] language which I
understand” (Ogden). The former is a direct statement of solipsism (only I understand
language), but on this reading Fogelin’s claim that Wittgenstein’s solipsism is wholly
unmotivated is justified. If we read him, rather, as saying that I only understand one
language, then we have a position that follows immediately from the general propositional
form, and from which Wittgenstein’s particular type of solipsism follows. This will be
explained presently.
Recall the first formulation of the general propositional form: “a description of the
propositions of any sign-language whatsoever.” (4.5) Of course it would simply be empirically
false to say that there is only one natural language, but Wittgenstein is not concerned with
the surface distinctions between natural languages. 104 He is concerned with the structure
underneath any language. And just as “p → q” and “~p v q” are nothing more than notational
variants of the same proposition, we should think of “Grass is green” and “Grass ist grün”
as nothing more than notational variants. Propositions picture possible states of affairs; any
two sentences that picture the same possible states of affairs – however they might look or
sound – are the same proposition. Wittgenstein is expressing this in 5.62, and it follows
immediately from 5.61: “Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.”
But now we must make sense of how this limit of language gives a limit of the world.
The point is that there can’t be another language outside of the one we have; again this
follows from 5.61: “We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we

Mounce discusses this distinction. (1981, 91-92)
Note that he says “sign-languages” whenever discussing notational variants (3.325, 2.242, 4.011, 4.1121,
4.1213, 4.5 and 6.124). This aligns with his distinction between “sign” and “symbol”, where “sign” is the
symbol independently of its meaning – it is just a bit of notation. (“We use the perceptible sign of a proposition
(spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation”) (3.11)
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cannot say either.” What a reader is to realize at this point is that language is nothing more
than another set of facts which is part of the world. Language, too, is simply part of the
world, governed by social conventions and physical bodies. There simply is no way to step
outside of the world, because we can only picture it (in thought or speech) through language,
which has precisely the same limitations. Propositions are facts, and facts determine the
world. So how does this make the world my world? Through a simple question: what can
we say about the will? The answer, of course, is “nothing.” We can “isolate” the will by
saying which parts of the world are subject to it, and which aren’t, but we cannot mention it.
(5.631) In thus seeing that there is no will in the world, we are led to the view that the world as
a whole is given to the will.
This tension between the world and the will is the primary concern of the last five
months of the existing notebooks. What Wittgenstein is trying to establish in these remarks
is the conclusion stated at 6.373: “the world is independent of my will.” He elaborates in
6.374:
Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favor granted
by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the world,
which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection itself is surely not
something that we could will.
Regardless of how strongly we will for something to happen, this does not guarantee that it
is going to. If it did happen it would be “a grace of fate.” One obvious counter-example is
our own body, and the Notebooks are littered with discussions of this problem. 105 But even if
our body does obey our own will, it is at least possible that it wouldn’t. There is no
necessary – no logical – connection even between our will and our body. There are a number
of passages in which Wittgenstein imagines a person who had no control over anything,
105

See NB 76, 77, 82, and 84-89.
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including his own body (NB 76-77, 81), and it seems clear that in this case we wouldn’t deny
that this person had a will. What this is taken to show is that the exercise of the will – that
“grace of fate” in which our body (or anything else) actually does obey our will – is not
essential to the will itself.
The issue at the beginning of this section was that the will is a necessary precondition
of the world, and therefore ethics – which resides in the will – can’t be normative. But here
we see Wittgenstein arguing precisely that there is no such necessary connection: the world is
independent of my will. The case is exactly as with logic. Wittgenstein writes, “As the
subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence, so good and evil
which are predicates of the subject, are not properties of the world.” (NB 79) The same view
survives into the Tractatus: “So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.”
(6.431) What actually happens is completely irrelevant for both logic and the will. Logic
establishes the possibility of contingent happenings: all change is a rearrangement of the
substance of the world in a logically ordered way. Without the logical structure there could
be no rearrangement within that structure. Likewise with the subject: without a subject – life
– there would be no world. The world as I found it is only possible if I found it.
If confronting the world is an activity of the will, then the relationship between the
will and the world brings us back to ethics. It is exactly in this tension between the necessary
presupposition of the will for the world and the independence of the world from the will
which is the domain of ethics, as Wittgenstein sees it.
2. Value
The progression starting at 6.4 is the only part of the Tractatus which explicitly
addresses ethics. In this section I will work through its main line. With only the first-level
comments, it runs:

97
6.4 All propositions are of equal value.
6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as
it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists – and if it did
exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of
what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself
be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so
to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy man.
6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
6.45 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.
All of this occurs as elucidation of 6.4, which shows that Wittgenstein’s primary concern in
all of these remarks is the ineffability of ethics and the consequences thereof. Propositions
express facts, and that is the end of the matter. All of Wittgenstein’s work in logic and
language was aimed at establishing this. Even absolutely general truths are nothing more
than truth-functions of elementary propositions; there is no room for importance or value in
a proposition.
Moving to 6.41, Wittgenstein expresses his conviction that all matters of fact,
regardless of whether they are general or particular, are contingent and unimportant. In “A
Lecture on Ethics” Wittgenstein asks his hearers to imagine the description of a murder. No
matter how much rage or pain such a description causes us, for any description “the murder
will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone…
there will simply be facts, facts, and facts, but no Ethics.” (LE 40) The nonsensicality of
ethical propositions “is their very essence… for all I want to do with them is just to go beyond
the world.” (LE 44) If there were ethical propositions, then they would have to express
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something in the world, and if they did express something in the world, then they would
simply be more contingent facts. This is what Wittgenstein means by saying that if value did
exist, then it would have no value. He elaborates further on this theme in the “Lecture”,
asking his audience to imagine the possibility of a science of ‘absolute’ ethics. He says, “I
can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics
which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other
books in the world.” (LE 40) The point is that “We cannot write a scientific book, the
subject matter of which could be intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matters.”
(Loc. Cit.) By placing ethics outside the world, Wittgenstein is attempting secure for it its
properly important place. Contrast this with his view of what is sayable, viz. natural science:
Wittgenstein calls “the superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science one of the
lowest desires of modern people.” (LE 37) 106
So far we know that ethics is sublime and ineffable, but what is it? At 6.43 we begin
to receive hints of a positive account. In the second paragraph we are told that the world
becomes a totally different world – it “waxes and wanes.” Immediately following the “wax and
wane” remark in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein writes, “as if by accession or loss of meaning.”
(NB 73) This indicates a connection to 6.521:107 “The solution of the problem of life is seen
in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a
long period of doubt that the meaning of life became clear to them have then been unable to
say what constituted that meaning?)” What we need to make sense of is this: in realizing that

106 See also 6.371 and 6.372, where Wittgenstein criticizes “the whole modern conception of the world”
because it believes the illusion that science gives explanations; for Wittgenstein it simply states facts, not
explanations of those facts.
107 6.521 occurs in the Notebooks just two days after the “wax and wane” remark.
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there is no problem of the meaning of life (in the sense of a scientific problem) 108 the world
changes; it becomes “the world of the happy man.”
Wittgenstein’s explanation is that “in order to live happily I must be in agreement
with the world. And that is what ‘being happy’ means.” (NB 75) There is a danger of seeing
Wittgenstein as simply saying that we ought to accept all the happenings in the world as
Good. On this view one can legitimately ask whether or not something is morally
acceptable, but it just happens that every such question is answered in the affirmative. This is
certainly not Wittgenstein’s position. Rather, we have to return to the considerations of
section 1: the world is independent of my will. In order to be content one must make
oneself independent of all contingent states of affairs. We begin the process by asking
questions about value: i.e. is it good that Jones is miserable, that I am without work, that my
mother is dead. These questions are the problem of life – Wittgenstein calls them “the
misery of the world.” (NB 81) His idea is that in seeing that we can’t do anything about
these things we see, not that they are acceptable, but that there is no sense in questioning
them in the first place. The world is in a constant state of flux and there is nothing we can
do to control that flux; all we can do is look at the world (life) as a totality and be either
content or not. In choosing the former one becomes “in agreement with an alien will”
(fate); one is “doing the will of God.” (NB 75) 109

This is an important condition; in saying that the problem vanishes Wittgenstein is certainly not saying that
we should just stop caring about what was originally worrying us. This interpretation is supported by all of the
remarks surrounding 6.521; the three preceding remarks are all about scientific questions that can be put into
words, and immediately following 6.521 Wittgenstein asserts, “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into
words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.” (6.522) See Anscombe’s discussion of this
remark. (1971, 169-171)
109 In discussion with Wiasmann, Wittgenstein said, “Schlick says that theological ethics contains two
conceptions of the essence of the Good. According to the more superficial interpretation, the Good is good
because God wills it; according to the deeper interpretation, God wills the Good because it is good. I think
that the first conception is the deeper one: Good is what God orders. For this cuts of the path to any and
every explanation ‘why’ it is good.” (Waismann 1965, 15)
108
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The next question, of course, is this: what is it to see the world as a totality,
independently of existing states of affairs? “To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view
it as a whole – a limited whole.” (6.45) Change is in time: all of the contingent states of
affairs which make up the world change as time changes. To abstract from these changes is
to abstract from temporality. Thus Wittgenstein asks, “is it possible for one so to live that
life stops being problematic? That one is living in eternity and not in time?” (NB 74)
Elaborating on this theme, Wittgenstein addresses what might be called the problem of life,
among all others: death. “Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life
belongs to those who live in the present.” (6.4311) 110 This is to say that one lives without
hope, fear or want. These are all signs that our will is not in agreement with the world, that it is
unsatisfied. If one accepts a timeless life – which is the world viewed as a totality
independent of states of affairs – then one is happy. For this reason suicide is “the
elementary sin” (NB 91): to accept life is to do right, to commit suicide is to reject it.
In “A Lecture on Ethics” Wittgenstein gives two experiences that are characteristic
of viewing the world in this way. The first, he says, is when “I wonder at the existence of
the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as ‘how extraordinary that anything
should exist’ or ‘how extraordinary that the world should exist.’” (LE 41) The second is “the
experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to say,
‘I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.” (Loc. Cit.) 111 The rest of the lecture is
concerned with establishing that these are bits of nonsense, and this brings us back to the
central question of the Tractatus: how can one express something that is nonsensical?
See also NB 74: “Only he who lives not in time but in the present is happy.”
Wittgenstein also connects these feelings to religion, writing “the first of them is, I believe, exactly what
people were referring to when they said that God had created the world; and the experience of absolute safety
has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God.” (LE 42)
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Because the nonsensicality of these remarks “is their very essence,” to see that they are
nonsensical is to understand them.
Wittgenstein’s simplest answer is this: art can express ethics. 6.421 states, “Ethics
and aesthetics are one and the same.” The Notebooks give a more precise account of this
connection: “Art is a kind of expression. Good art is complete expression. The work of art
is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis.
This is the connection between art and ethics.” (NB 83) Wittgenstein sees art as presenting
an object “with the whole world as background” (Loc. Cit.), and in so doing it presents it
independently of all contingency. In this way art connects with logic: “Each thing modifies
the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak. (The thought forces itself
upon one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole of
logical space.” (Loc. Cit.) Throughout I have stressed that Wittgenstein is simultaneously an
atomist and a holist: propositions say something about a state of affairs as they are
independent from all others, but they show the necessary logical connections between these
propositions. The force of each proposition “reaches through the whole of logical space.”
(3.42) What is said is temporal; what is shown is eternal. Art expresses only the eternal: the object
seen only as a part of the limited whole and independently of its contingent connections to
things.
Returning to the astonishing fact “that the world exists”, he writes, “Aesthetically, the
miracle is that the world exists. That there is what there is. Is it the essence of the artistic
way of looking at things, that it looks at the world with a happy eye? Life is grave, art is
gay.” (NB 86) 112 To live the good life – the happy and eternal life – is to see things as the work
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The editors of the Notebooks connect the concluding sentence of this remark to a quote from Schiller.
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of art sees things: as beautiful (“beautiful is what makes happy”). (Loc. Cit.) 113 The world and
the will are in a necessary connection, in that without the will there is no world; but there is
nonetheless the lack of a connection – the contingency – in that the world is independent of
our will. 114 Both he who leads an ethical life and the expressive work of art concern
themselves only with the necessary connection, and renounce all contingency. The world is
all that is the case, the totality of facts. To be concerned with the problem of life is to live
within those facts – “in the midst of them, as it were.” (NB 83) To see the world sub specie
aeterni is to view the world as the totality, from “outside.” It is this that is mystical (6.45) and
makes itself manifest. (6.522)
Of course the question still nags: perhaps a work of art can express the unsayable,
but what about Wittgenstein’s statements in the Tractatus?

3. Silence
This concluding section will discuss Wittgenstein’s final three remarks; it is in them
that he tells us how to view his book as a whole. The first is 6.53:
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science – i.e. something that has
nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning
to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other
person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this
method would be the only strictly correct one.
The first important thing to note is that, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein definitely does not
adhere to this “strictly correct” method. What the Tractatus seems to be doing is paving the
113 Anscombe sums up the point well: “The world thought of, not as how things are, but as however they are –
seen as a whole – is the matter of logic; thought of as my life, it is the matter of ethics; thought of as an object
of contemplation, the matter of aesthetics: all these, then, are transcendental.” (Anscombe 1971, 172-173)
114 Cf 2.0122: “Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of
independence is a form of connection with states of affairs, a form of dependence.)”
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way for such a method to be possible. Compare this passage with 4.112: “Philosophy aims
at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.”
Wittgenstein has not given us propositions; he has given us the necessary preconditions for
propositions. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s presentation of the general form of a proposition
is the completion of his philosophical project. Now that we know how propositions picture
the world, viz. by being a truth function of elementary propositions, we can point out to
philosophers that their sentences fail to satisfy this condition.
Wittgenstein is not giving a positive method of philosophy. He is critiquing
philosophy; or better, he is giving an argument that philosophy cannot accomplish anything
of significance. He gives a logical characterization of how language works, and in so doing
he has shown how to divide assertions into the legitimate (which are unimportant) and the
nonsensical – the assertions of old philosophers – which the “strict” philosopher
“demonstrates” to be nonsensical. On neither side do we obtain anything of significance;
we are left with what he had to begin with: the propositions of natural science. To quote the
Preface, we found, first, “the final solution of the problems” in the general form of a
proposition, but second, “how little is achieved when these problems are solved.”
In 6.53 Wittgenstein tells us how to point out to philosophers that they are speaking
nonsense; in 6.54 he points this out to himself:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands
me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed out through
them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
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What has become known as the “standard” reading 115 of this passage sees it as making too
strong of a claim. This is common to most of the introductory books on the Tractatus (i.e.
Anscome, Mounce, and Fogelin), and the most direct statement of it comes in Black, who
argues that Wittgenstein is too quick to equate nonsense with gibberish, especially since
much of the Tractatus is devoted to demonstrating how one can show things which cannot
be said.
On Blacks’ view, the nonsensical status of Wittgenstein’s remarks becomes a
subsidiary point. A reader of the Tractatus is still left with the philosophical doctrines
expounded therein, just with the caveat that one must recognize that these doctrines can
only be shown. Wittgenstein is a philosopher just like any other (even if he didn’t think so);
what is unique to him is his claim that one must express one’s philosophy in a different way.
The vast majority of the literature on the Tractatus implicitly agrees with this position in
simply not dealing with 6.54 and addressing Wittgenstein’s his philosophy directly.
But it seems clear that if one wants to understand the work itself, another path must
be taken; of ethics, at least, Wittgenstein explicitly remarked that nonsensicality was its very
essence. (LE 44) The standard reading sees the nonsensical status of the Tractatus almost as a
setback, as an unfortunate snag which requires that philosophers find a new way to
philosophize. As a response, recent scholarship has propounded a “new Wittgenstein.” My
interpretation of 6.54 and 7 takes their work as a starting point, so I will give a brief account
of the most prominent “new” work on the Tractatus: that of James Conant and Cora
Diamond.
The core of their interpretation is that the propositions of the Tractatus are, as
Wittgenstein says in the preface, “simply nonsense.” Therefore one cannot literally
This is, of course, a wide generalization; the only thing common to “standard” interpreters is that they read
Wittgenstein as showing a philosophy.
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understand the Tractatus. Rather, one understands Wittgenstein in realizing that the book is
nonsense. Conant gives a powerful argument in “Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and
Early Wittgenstein” that the division (explicit in Black) between substantial and austere
nonsense is not present in the Tractatus. Indeed, he sees the Tractatus first and foremost as an
attempt to critique this division as it occurs in Frege. (Conant 2000, 179-195)
Unfortunately, assigning this position to Wittgenstein leaves him in utter and
complete incoherence. But not only in the sense in which they would like him to be
incoherent (as writing austere nonsense), but also in the sense that there is surely at least some
difference between “the world is all that is the case” and “a;laksjdf;ioadu.” And if we are to
hold that Wittgenstein is doing anything with the book, then there must be some explanation
of how (a writer of) austere nonsense, but not gibberish, is able to do something. The onus
is thus on Conant and Diamond to explain this difference, as well as why we are at least
under the illusion that we can understand the book, but are under no such illusion with pure
gibberish.
Both of them obviously recognize the problem, and they offer similar solutions.
Diamond begins with the astute observation that, if “p” is nonsense, one can’t even be
under the illusion that p, or believe that p. (Diamond 2000, 157) Any such situation is to have
a propositional attitude; but one can’t have a propositional attitude to a non-proposition.
(She might also have noted Wittgenstein’s brief account of the propositional attitudes at
5.541-5.542). How, then, could the Tractatus do anything? Diamond writes,
My point then is that the Tractatus, in its understanding of itself as addressed to those
who are in the grip of philosophical nonsense, and in its understanding of the kind
of demands it makes on its readers, supposes a kind of imaginative activity, an exercise
of the capacity to enter into the taking of nonsense for sense, of the capacity to share
imaginatively the inclination that one is thinking something in it. (Ibid, 157-158;
emphasis mine)
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The italicized remark is the core of her account: one can “understand” nonsense only by
imagining that it is sense. The Tractatus works because its intended readers are precisely those
who are imagining philosophical propositions to have sense. The purpose of the Tractatus is
to purge them of this illusory imaginative activity. Conant ‘s view is similar:
Thus the elucidatory strategy of the Tractatus depends on the reader’s provisionally
taking himself to be participating in the traditional philosophical activity of
establishing theses… but it only succeeds if the reader fully comes to understand…
that the work results not in Philosophische Sätze [philosophical propositions] but in das
Klarwerden von Sätzen. [clarification of propositions] And the attainment of this
recognition depends on the reader’s actually undergoing a certain experience… the
reader’s experience of having his illusion of sense… dissipate through its becoming
clear to him that (what he took to be) the philosophische Sätze of the work are Unsinn.
[nonsense] (Conant 2000, 196-7)
The “new Tractatus” is an attempt to get philosophers who are under the illusion that they
are doing something to realize that they are doing nothing.
Unfortunately, neither of them have touched the difficulty that they set out to solve.
Diamond tries to get around her propositional attitude argument by saying that we imagine,
not that “p” is true, but that it makes sense. But just try to imagine that “twiddle twoodle
twaddle” makes sense. Perhaps her way of phrasing the solution tries to get around this: we
don’t imagine that nonsense makes sense, we “enter into the imaginative activity” according to
which nonsense makes sense. But this doesn’t fare any better – how can you enter into an
imaginative activity in which you imagine something that is unimaginable? The same applies
to Conant: how can one be under the illusion that nonsense makes sense?
The very arguments that they put forward to critique the standard reading cause
problems for their own reading. This is a systematic mistake, and it is crystallized in the
following passage from Conant:
So on the reading of the Tractatus suggested here, what is to happen, if the book
succeeds in its aim, is not that I (1) succeed in conceiving of an extraordinary
possibility (illogical thought), (2) judge “it” to be impossible, (3) conclude that the
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truth of this judgment cannot be accommodated within (the logical structure of)
language because it is about (the logical structure of) language and (4) go on to
communicate (under the guise of only “showing” and not “saying” “it”) what it is
that cannot be said. Rather, what is to happen is that I am lured up all four of these
rungs of the ladder and then: (5) throw the entire ladder (all four of the previous
rungs) away. (Ibid, 196)
Again, how do we climb up a ladder that doesn’t exist? The problem with Conant’s and
Diamond’s reading is this: they hope to add (5) to the standard reading by rejecting the
standard reading, which is expressed in (1)-(4). But (5) can only result as a consequence of
(1)-(4); if we eliminate the possibility of (1)-(4) then we eliminate the possibility of (5).
There are some passages in the Tractatus which find absolutely no place in the new
reading. In the Preface, Wittgenstein says that thoughts are expressed in the book, and
furthermore, that the truth of them is unassailable and definitive. A remark about solipsism
in 5.62 states precisely the opposite of their view: “what the solipsist means is quite correct;
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.” Diamond and Conant could try to
accommodate these by arguing that they are part of the process, and that they must
eventually be rejected. But this move is the most serious problem with the new reading, for
if we really do reject everything in the Tractatus, on what grounds are we making this
rejection? The “pseudo-philosophical” task of the Tractatus is to draw a distinction between
sense and nonsense, but without the pseudo-philosophical account of this distinction we no
longer have any reason to reject anything as nonsense. We are led strait into a paradox: the
Tractatus tells us that it is nonsensical iff it does not tell us anything, a fortiori iff it does not
tell us that it is nonsensical.
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Where Conant and Diamond are correct is in stressing that the Tractatus must be read
as offering a process that the reader must go through. 116 Where they are wrong is in
supposing that at the end of this process there is absolutely nothing left. But we can’t simply
resort to Black’s “standard” reading, either. Even if we do allow a broader notion of
nonsense than the “austere” version, it would be a serious mistake to see Wittgenstein as
propounding a philosophical doctrine. On my view, what we must reject at the end of the
book is that what we have been doing is philosophy, insofar as philosophy is thought of as a
series of statements. We are left with a critique of philosophy, just as Diamond and Conant
argue, but that is not the end of the matter: the conclusion of the book also contains an
affirmation of the mystical.
What we need is a broader notion of nonsense. And, in fact, it seems that such a
notion of nonsense is required independently of any consideration of the Tractatus. In
slightly different terminology, Paul Benacerraf explains my point in relation to what he sees
as ungrammatical identity statements: “they are not totally senseless, for we grasp enough of
their sense to explain why they are senseless.” (Benacerraf 1965, 64) Nobody calls a chair
nonsense, nor do they ask whether a skip or a jump has any sense to it. It would even seem
strange to say that “a;lkdfjaoisdvjhaodi” is a bit of nonsense – it just isn’t anything except a
bunch of symbols. The term “nonsense” is reserved for cases which try to have sense; only
when a linguistic construction is somehow related to sense can it be nonsensical. This is a
fascinating philosophical problem in its own right, and one which I couldn’t hope to solve
here. But Wittgenstein gives us a definition of nonsense, and that is our present concern.

This is corroborated by the remark cited in the introduction to this thesis, to the effect that Wittgenstein
believed that only somebody who had these thoughts independently and then found his book would understand
him. (LCK 78)
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Nonsense is a series of signs in a combination to which we have given no meaning.
For meaningful propositions we have laid down, via convention, rules of projection in order
that they can picture states of affairs; there are no such rules for a nonsensical string. But
beyond this we are given no characterization of nonsense in the Tractatus. This is a primarily
negative criterion; it doesn’t say anything about what nonsense can do. All it says is that
nonsense can’t picture states of affairs. I thus propose that we look at things another way;
instead of saying that the Tractatus is nonsensical, and then asking what a nonsensical work
can do, we should ask what the Tractatus does, and then infer that Wittgenstein believes that
nonsense can do such things. For it is clear that nonsense must be able to do something, if it
couldn’t it wouldn’t be nonsense, but rather just a fact.
What the Tractatus has done, up until the final three remarks, is to sketch what
appears to be a philosophical system. What is particular to this system, in relation to all
others, is that to understand it is to see that it is superfluous. (This is all still ignoring the
final three remarks.) His metaphysics, his philosophy of language, and his philosophy of
logic are all supposed to be captured in the general form of a proposition. This logical
construction gives us the necessary preconditions for the existence of the world and
language. To see that his “philosophical” claims are valid is to see that they are displayed in
logic itself: the great mirror. And logical propositions are not nonsensical, but senseless. So
regardless of what we end up deciding about the status of the meta-logical statements in the
Tractatus, we are still left with tautology and contradiction, and also with what they show.
What we see from tautology and contradiction is that the world is orderly. But even
this is something which we try to say about what logic shows; Wittgenstein writes in the
Notebooks, “There cannot be an orderly or a disorderly world, so that one could say that our
world is orderly. In every possible world there is an order even if it is a complicated one,
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just as in space too there are not orderly and disorderly distributions of points, but every
distribution of points is orderly.” (NB 83) The same point follows from the impossibility of
illogical thought; we have to give up the idea that we have said anything about the logical
structure of language – every language, if it is a language, has a logical structure. But it
makes no sense to say this because it couldn’t not be the case; it is shown through the
existence of logic. The difficulty is the same one which has been plaguing us all along:
something is shown by logic but every attempt to say what that something is falls into
nonsense.
Let us return to “A Lecture on Ethics”, and Wittgenstein’s remark about “wondering
at the existence of the world.” He says that this “is exactly what people were referring to
when they said that God had created the world.” (LE 42) This demonstrates, he thinks, that
“in ethical and religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a simile must
be the simile for something. He then presses further, trying to express the simile in more and
more ways: “I will now describe the experience of wondering at the existence of the world
by saying: it is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle.” (Loc. Cit.) Again: “the right
expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any
proposition in language, is the existence of language itself.” (LE 44) This does seem to come
even closer: for the existence of language presupposes some order of the world, and it
presupposes the world as a totality situated in logical space: that is, it presupposes the
existence of a limited whole. But even this, of course, is nonsense, for the existence of
language doesn’t say anything at all.
What we see in the process of attempting to explain the “simile” is an attempt to
turn nonsense into sense. This is roughly how Diamond sees the Tractatus as proceeding,
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and rightly so. But we can’t view nonsense as nothing; Wittgenstein’s point is simply that it
can’t be turned into sense. Let us look at 6.54 again:
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands
me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed out through
them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
In recognizing that his propositions are nonsensical we do not recognize that he hasn’t done
anything in the Tractatus at all. We realize that we can no longer accept the pseudophilosophical remarks about facts, states of affairs, pictures, substance, etc… as
philosophical remarks. They are nonsensical stabs at expressing wonder at the existence of
the world, just as is the remark “God created the world.” We can’t break the point down
any further. What Wittgenstein does in the Tractatus is break it down as clearly as possible
and then show his own failure. While we can try to press our “religious or ethical” similes
further, there is no point in doing so. No matter how far we go we are still left with
nonsense. We must transcend this urge.
In the conclusion of the Lecture, he says,
This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so
far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life,
the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not
add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human
mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life
ridicule it. (LE 44)
This is not to say that Wittgenstein respects all attempts to thrash against the walls of our
cage; “In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my
book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it.” (in Engelmann 1967, 143)
What Wittgenstein respects is ethical and religious language which recognizes itself as such; the
attempt to make it philosophical is the attempt to turn nonsense into sense. As Wittgenstein
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put it in a discussion with Waismann, “The thrust against the limits of language is ethics. I
regard it as very important to put an end to all the chatter about ethics – whether there is
knowledge in ethics, whether there are values, whether the Good can be defined, etc…”
(Waismann 1965, 13) It is the chatter about ethics with which Wittgenstein takes issue, not
ethics itself.
We cannot speak about things which make themselves manifest. We are told in the
awesomely conclusive final remark of the book that we must therefore pass them over in
silence. It would be misguided to take this remark as an imperative. One might ask, á la
6.42, “and what if I do not?” We can’t not remain silent about the ineffable. What we can
do is either try to say something about it, or we can try to show something about it. To take
the former path is to philosophize, and Wittgenstein tries to show that it is utterly hopeless.
To take the latter path is to construct a work of art. In his discussions with the Vienna
Circle, Wittgenstein asked, “What is valuable in a Beethoven Sonata?” The sequence of
sounds? Beethoven’s feelings? A mental state induced by the music? In response to all of
these Wittgenstein says, “Whatever explanation one gives me I would reject it, indeed, not
because the explanation is false, but because it is an explanation. Whenever someone gives
me a theory I would say: “No! No! I don’t care about that! Even if the theory were true I
wouldn’t care about it. It still wouldn’t be what I’m looking for.” (Wittgenstein 1984b, 116;
translation mine) The Tractatus begins by presenting what appears to be a philosophical
system, but ends up showing us that such a system is impossible. It becomes, in its
conclusion, a creative work of art which documents the collapse of philosophy into silence
and mysticism.
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